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STATEv1E~T 0 r: I SSUFS 
1. i','hether tJ1e district court erred in refu::jnG to rcvu:,.; the 
to construct the Tellico Proj Cf',t in accoTdarJce with the stcmdanls ~;ct forth in 
S;:;ction 101 of the National J~wi:ronn;ental Policy Act (NEPA). 
2. 1Vh.ether the: district court en:cd in its dc:term.ination that the final en 
viro:nmental j.Jnpact statement for the Tellico Project met the requirements of Se.:-
tion 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act. 
3. Whether the district cour~c erred in its dete:rrnination that the appellees 
had fully coill'plied with the requirements of section 102 (2) (D) of Nt:PA to develop 
and analyze alternatives to the Tellico Project and to evaluate fully the environ-
mental impacts of such alternatives. 
4. Whether the district court erred in its dete11Tl.i11ation that the appellees 
had fully complied with the requirements of Section 102(2)(B) of :NEPA to develop 
methods and procedl' res for the consideration or quai1.tification of environmental 
. . 
values alan. with economic and technical considerations. 
5. Whether the district court erred in its determin~lt3.on that the FedeT~.l 
Water Pollution Control Act Amenchnents of 1972 v.rere not applicable to the construe-
tion of the Tellico Project. 
6. l\lhether the district court erred in its ref·usal to enter c;m injunction 
against further construction of the Tellico Project in light of its express hold-
:ing that the appellees had not yet complied fully vJi th the National Historic Pre-
servation Act. 
7. Whether the district court erred in dismissing appellants' claims under 
the Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the United States Const" i::ution . 
. 8. Whether the district court erred in its refusal to award reasonable 
attm.T1eys 1 fees and all costs to plaintiffs in connection with the pn~.sent liti -· 
gation. 
--:-:-:-:-:-:~:-:-:-:-:~:-, ·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:---:--------.-.-:-~-:-=- -. ------ t=-:-:-:-:-:-:-:--- --:-:-:-:-: 
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STATEl\1E)iT OF 'l1IE C~fl..SE 
The history of this litigation JJ ., the ckscr:iption of the Tellico PToject are 
f-ully set fortl1 in the opinion of this Court upholding the prel imin.::ny injunction 
issued by ~l~ district court on Janu~'TY 11, 19'72. EmriTonmental Defense F1.md v. 
Tennessee VC!.l ley Autl~ori/t:2':> 468 F. 2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). Follmring the decision 
of this Court, a trial on the merits was held before the district court from Sep-
tember 17 through September 20,. 1973. On October 25, 1973, the district court 
issued its Memorandum Opinion. holding that the defendants had complied sufficiently 
with the Federal laws whose violation had been alleged by the plaintiffs, and that 
the prelimina1y injunction should be dissolved. The Order of the district court 
was entered on November 1, 1973, and the same day the plaintiffs~ (hereinafter 
appellants), filed their Notice of Appeal, Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal and 
Mernorandtnn in support thereof. That Motion was denied. Appellants also filed a 
fvi0tion for Award of Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs, which was also denied 
as to atton1eys' fees. Thereafter, on November S ~ 1973,. the appellants filed Hith 
this Court a Motion for Sta.y Pending Appeal ;;md to Expedite Appeal a...TJ.d Brief in 
Support TI1ereof, along 1vi th certain orders previously rendered by the district court 
and pleadings filed by the appellants in connec-tion therewi ijl. 
By 01'der dated November 9 1 1973, this Court denied appellants' Motion for 
Stay Pending Appeal and granted appellants' Motion to Expedite P.ppea1 1 setting the 
case down for oral argument on December 7, 1973. TI1is brief is filed in accordance 
h'i th the Order of the Court requiring that appellants' initial brief be filed on 
'Vember 21, 1973, that appellr::es' brief be filed on or before Novetoer 28y 1973, 
1 that the appellants' reply brief be filed on or before December 3, 1973. 
1;ecause of the briefing schedule set down by the Court, the appellants have been 
uithout benefit of a trz:.nscript of record in preparing this brief. Hm1ever, in 
tJK~ absence of a stay pending· appeal, the appell&lts have concluded that they lv-j.ll 
not seek a further delay in spite of the ~.:,evere :1andicaps of p-roceeding without 
:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::--: <<-:-: ~----- . ------- -:----------------------------------~-~-:-: :-:-:-:->·----- :-:-:-:-:-:------------------.-.--
·. 
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benefit of a complete record. 
The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. 
This is an environmer.ta1 case. It is also a case which involves the cultural 
and sacred heritage of a great Indian people and a significant chapter in American 
history. The Tellico Project will im.mdate the fimil 33 miles of the. Little 
Tennessee River, transforming it from a magnificent cold water trout stream to a 
16,000-acre reservoir. In the process, the waters will inundate major portions 
of the historic homeland of the Cherokee Indiana and obliterate the sites of their 
most important villages. Among these are the sites of Tenasi, from which the 
State of Tennessee derives its name; Tuskegee, the birthplace of the Cherokee 
scholar Sequoyah who devised the Cherokee alphabet and whose statue rests in the 
national capital rotunda in Washington, D.C.; and Chota, the sacred capital and 
village of refuge of the Cherokee Indians. 
As an indication of the historic significance o£ these sites, it is important 
to note that the village site of Chota-Tenasi has recently been included in the 
National Register of Historic Places by the Federal Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation, acting under the Authority of the National Historic Sites Act, 
16 U.S.C. Sec. 461 et ~· The sites included on the National Register are those 
of greatest national historic significance and their inclusion manifests the in-
tent of Congress that they not be destroyed in the absence of the most compelling 
reasons. 
The area to be inundated by the Tellico Reservoir was described by appellants' 
witness Mack Prichard, the State Archaeologist of the State of Tennessee, as the 
mJst significant archaeological area within the State. The Eastern band of Chero-
kees themselves have adopted a tribal resolution opposing the desecration of 
their homeland by the Tellico Reservoir. (Ex. 32). 
The Governor of the State of Tennessee, the Honorable lVinfield Dunn, r2s 
also opposed the further construction of the Tellico Project. (Ex. 17). As an 
alternative to the project, the executive staff of the Governor prepared a 
:-:-:-:-:-:.>:·:-:-:-:-:-: ;-::--:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:· 1-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:->:: ·,.-:-::--::--:-:----.----·-·-·.-----. ··.·.-.·--.: 
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co~ mp r e h ensive plan for the preservation of the 01erokee village sites, 
the designation of a scenic river and the development of a state park on the banks 1/ of the Little Tennessee River. (Ex. _) .- Such an alternative to tl1e Tellico Pro-ject, alt.hough mentioned brie£ly in the environmental impact statement (EIS) for 
the projectll was given only cursory attention by the appellees. (Ex. 21, p. I-1-46). 
The historical, ecological and cultural importance of the Valley of the Little 
Tennessee River underscores the critical role which the National Envirorunental 
Policy Act was designed to play in the resource planning of this nation. That 
role is reflected in the Act itself, which requires that the environmental impact 
of resource projects be considered "to the fullest extent possible." Section 
102(1) and 102(2) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4331 and 4332; Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.Zd 1164, 1174 and 1175-1176 (6th 
Cir. 1972). As this Court stated in its earlier opinion, the provisions of NEPA 
"establish a strict sta:1dard of compliance," 468 F.Zd at 1174. The rationale 
and the Jnandates are clear, for in·the absence of strict compliance with the 
requirements of NEPA, the ultiinate decisionmakers and the publici tself are 
den_ied the opportunity to evaluate fully and rationally the decision to proceed 
1.dth a project of the magnitude of the Tellico Project. In the absence of full 
and objective consideration of a project by the responsible agency, the ultimate 
decisionmakers are given no more guidance regarding the advisability of a pro-ject than existed prior to NEPA. We believe that a consideration of the opinion 
below in light of the record will reflect most clearly its own infimities and 
those of the agency review process for the Tellico Project whic;; Congress sought 
to remedy with the enactment of NEPA. 
1/ The number of this exhibit is presently mw.vailable. Accordingly, a copy of the plan has been attached for the use of the Court. 
i > 
-. 
.. 
.-
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In the meantime, the appellants are informed by counsel for the appellees 
that construction work has again commenced on the Tellico Dam. Accordingly, we 
wish to express our gratitude to the Court for the expeditious manner in which 
this appeal is being considered. At the same time, however, we wish to reiterate 
that an examination of the complete record is extremely important to a full under-
standing of the issues presented below. Since appellants have not had the benefit 
of access to the complete record, this brief, of necessity, must reflect in some-· 
What general terms the testimony presented. Nevertheless, we can assure the 
Court that it represents an accurate recollection of the evidence and can be sub-
stantiated by reference to the record •. · 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
.. 
1HE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO APPLY TI-lE PROPER SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 1HE AGENCY DECISION TO C00;STRUCT TilE 
TELLICO PROJECT 
Section lOl(b) of .NEPA, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 433l(b) provides, inter alia, that: 
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable 
means, consistent with other essential con-
siderations of national policy, to improve 
and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may -
(1) fUlfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations; 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
(4) preserve important historic, cultural 
and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever pos-
sible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual 
choice; 
--------.-.-------------'0 ------ -_-_-:-:-:-~-~- --- ---
-. 
.. 
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(5) achieve a balance between population 
and resource use which will permit 
high standards of living and a wide 
sharing of life's amenities * * * * (emphasis added). 
Very little dispute remains as to whether the courts are empowered to review 
the substantive decisions of agencies under Section 101 of NEPA. While several 
earlier cases decided under NEPA tended to restrict the scope of review to '~ro-
cedural" compliance under Section 102 of the Act, the more recent appellate court 
decisions have halted that trend. The initial breakthrough carne in the landmark 
case of Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
The Court of Appeals stated that (449 F.2d 1115): 
The reviewing court probably cannot reverse 
a substantive decision on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown that the ac-
tual balance of costs and ber:efits that was 
struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insuf-ficient weight to environmental values. 
The language of the District of Columbia Circuit was given further vitality 
by the Eighth Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 
289 (8th Cir. 1972), in which the Court of Appeals held that: 
Given an agency obligation to carry out the 
substantive requirements of the Act, we be-lieve that courts have an obligation to re-
view substantive agency decisions on the 
merits whether we look to common law or the 
· A:::Iministrative Procedure Act, absent 'legis-lative guidance as to reviewability, an 
· administrative determination affecting legal 
rights in reviewable unless some special 
reason appears for not reviewing.' K. Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise 18, 25 (1958) (Footnote omitted). Here, important legal 
rights are affected. NEPA is silent as to judicial review, and no special reasons 
appear for not reviewing the decisions of 
the agency. To the contrary, the prospect 
of substantive review should improve the quality of agency decisions and should make it more likely that the broad purposes of 
NEPA will be realized. (470 F.2d at 298 
1-:-:-:-:-:-:-:- ------_-_-_._._·--:-.-.·.·.----- .. t=-=:=:=:=::-:-:-:::-:,::::-:::: ·----.-.·. -- . -- :-:-·-:-:-:-:-:-:·:<-:-:-:-:-:-; 
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y 
- 299). 
Shortly after tl1e decision.s of the Eighth Circuit, the Fom~th Circuit held 
that substantive reviev: under section 101 was required. Consenration Cou_nci1 of 
~Carolina v. Frochlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1972). Furthermore, as stated 
by the Eighth Circuit in EJ:lvirorunental Defense Fund v. COI]JS of Engineers~- SU]JT~, 
at 299-300, the detennination of substantive reviewability "is supported by the 
District of Columbia Circuit, the Second Circuit and Fourth Circuit, and by tl1e 
analogous decision of the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)". 
The most commonly-expressed standard of review under Section 101 was set forth 
by the Eighth Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, ~ra, 
470 F.2d at 300: 
'Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court 
must first detennine if the agency reached its decision after a full, good faith con-
sideration and balancing of enviTonmental 
factors. The court must then detennine, 
according to the standards set forth in 
Sections lOl(b) and 102(1) of the Act, 
whether 'the actual balance of costs 
and benefits that w::>.s struck was arbi-
trary or clearly gave insufficient weight 
to environmental values.' 
WLile the court is not ernpowered to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency, t11e inquiry into the facts ITlllSt be 11searching and careful". Ibid., citing 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416. Any other standard 
of review would allow the agencies to become the arbiters of their ovm conduct 
and a law unto themselves. 
Other courts have set forth similar standards for revlew and the concomitant 
agency responsibilities which such review requires. This Court itself~ in 
2/ The scope of reviC\v was n::iter,:ltecl by the Eighth Cin:t.nt in Enyironrr~ Defense Fund v. Froehlke~ 473 F.2cl 346 (1972). 
--------.----------------· .-.----------------------- ----.--<-~-:-:-~---------- -------
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earlier opinion in these proceedings, cstaolished tbc rcqt.tirement for "reconsideL:~-
tion of t11e (Tellico) project in lig11t of tl;e provi::;ions of Section 101 . . . tt 
468 F.2d at 1183-84. 
An analogous standard of Teviel! UJ1.dcr Section 101 was set forth L"L Sie:rra 3/-·--Club v. Froehlke, F. Supp. __ , 5 ERC 1033 (S.D. Texas, 1973) ~-perhaps 
the most e)d1austive considr:;ration of l'LEPA to date. 
The Com·t described the substantive duty of agencies as one of mitigation, 
stating that (5 ERC 1065): 
Mitigation - TI1e Substantive Requirement: 
[5] NEPA states indirectly, but affirma-
tively, that under some ciTcumstances federal agencies must mitigate some and possibly all of the environmental impacts 
arising from a pToposed project. This 
requirement is embodied primm · ly within Section 101, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4331, with 
· irrqJortant implementing assistance from Section 102, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4332. This Court will not endeavor to catalogue all pernrutations of this requirement, but 
will highlight a few as they apply to 
the present litigation. 
Consistent <·,ri th other essential con-
siderations of national policy, all federal 
agencies must "use all practic1ble means" to as:::~tre safe surrow-:tdings, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4331 (a), (b) (3), and to pTeserve im- , portant histoTic ~ cultural and natural 
aspects of our national heritage. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 433l(a),(b)(4). While 
tested by a rule of practicability with 
respect to other essential consider-ations 
of national policy, these requirements 
must be imple11 1ted "to the fullest extent i)OSsible". 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4332. 
Although the mitigation Tequirement has 
not been examined in the Telatively few 
Where official citations are not available, the BN/1. Envirorunental Reporter ERC citations will be used. 
------:-:-:-:-:-:-~-:-::..; -::-:-:-:-:-::-:-:->>·------------.-:-:-:-: -----------_-_.._ 
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reported cases to clat .. ~., its signifiGmcc is implicit in the guidelines of the CEQ 
and EPA. For example, the CT.Q guidelines 
since first issued. in 1970 have required that: 
• Fed2ra1 agencies will . . . assess in detail thF; pote11tial environmental im-pact in order that adverse effects are 
avoided,-andE::nvironmental qualitv 1sre-
stored or eJ~haJ1Ced, ~to. the full ext extent practicab~e. in particular, alternativ-e 
actions that will minimize adverse impact 
should be explored and both the long-short 
range implications to man, his physical and 
social surToundings, and to nat;.1re, should be evaluated in order to avoid to the full-
est extent practicable undesirable conse-quences for the environment. IB mphasis 
added). 
The more recent EPA guidelines provide that: 
Remedial, protective and mitigative measures 
which will be taken as part of the proposed 
action shall be identified. These measures to prevent, eliminate, redt:r~e or compensate for any environmentally detrimental aspects 
of the proposed action shall include those 
of the agency and others, e.g., its con-tractors and grantees. 
This Court is fully a\vare that rn.:my cases have held that I\TEPA does not create "substantive" 
rights, but rather creates only "proc::dural" 
obligations. [citations omitted]. To the extent that NEPA does not articulate acceptable levels 
of air, water, heat and noise pollution, this is an accurate position. To the extent that NEPA does not give the courts the final decision 
with respect to which way a highway should go, or 1trhich trees should stand and which should fall, this is an accurate position. But to the extent that it would allow the agencies merely to dis-
close the lil(e ly harm without reflecting a sub-
stantial effort to prevent or minimize environ-
mental harm, it is not an accurate position of the role of the courts under NIPA. 
The foregoing authorities establish beyond serious question that the courts 
hav a responsibility to review substant.i.ve agc:'.ncy action under the national poli ·-
cies set forth in Section 101 of NEPA. That responsibility is particulaTly acute, 
-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:'"; ~~~~~~---------------------------.-- ~-~-:-:-: ;-:-:-:-:-:-:-::--:-:-:-:-~-=--------.-- ------.-.--·.;, 
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c_and the revieH must be extTaordinarily searching, in the present case. As set 
f'O"rth above, one of the national policies establishc'Cl in section 101 is tl1e ~-
servation of "important historic, cultural and natural aspects of our national 
heritage." The Tellico Project indisputably ir"Lvol ves the destruction of many of 
these values; indeed, it is difficult to jJllagine a project v;hich so directly 
threatens the values protected by section 101 of NEPA. 
Tirus, the type of review afforded by section 101, as discussed hereinabove, 
is essentially threefold. The first element of substantive review involves the 
standards adopted by the Eighth, Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits. It 
requires a searching inquiry into th~ "actual balance of costs and benefits" for 
the project, and a determination by the reviewing court as to whether the agency 
-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:---:----
consideratioH of costs and benefits for the project was "arbitrary or clearly gave 
insufficient weight to environmental values." The second element of review is 
both substantive and ·c~mporal. As set forth by this Court in its initial opinion, 
. . it involves whether the agency, subsequeht to enactment of W.t:PA, has 1.mdertaken 
meaningful "reconsideration of the project in light of the provisions of section 
101" of l'.J'EPA. The third elemeat of the review process, an emmciated ln Sierra 
Club v. Froehlke, ~ra, requires a determination of the efforts of the agency to 
mitigate the adverse impacts of the project in light of the national policies 
established in section 101. In the present case, the district court fu:iled to make 
the searching inquiry of the agency decisionmaJcing process required by section 
101 of NEPA, and, indeed, disregarded the relevant evidence presented by the appel-
lants by the adoption of a scope of review which meets none of the standards here-
tofore descTibed. 
1. 
The DistTict Court Failed to Adopt the Standards of Review Set Forth by the Eighth, Fourth 8Jld District of Columbia Circuits, and Thereby Erred in Disre-garding Relevant Evidence. 
The general discussion of substantive Teview lillder section 101 undertaken by 
~---------------------. .- ------ -----~-=-~-= ·=--<-.-_·.<-~ :-_-_._-_-:---~--- ------
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the district ccurt appears at pages 21-26 of the 1\!emorandum Opinion. At best, it 
is confusing. Whatever its intent, it does not comport 1vith the "searc:J1ing and 
carefuln inquiry into the "costs and benefits" of the T'311ico Project required by 
other appellate courts. It has the patina of reasonableness but the substance of 
cotton candy. 
Mter first conceding the appellants' 11right to challenge: the decision to con-
tinue with the proj ec·t as designated" (Mem. Op. 22) and setting forth the standard 
of review adopted by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits involving a searching scrutiny 
of "costs and benefits" of the project, the opinion disintegrates into a contra-
_dictory discussion of the very reviewability of costs and benefits. In consecutive 
paragraphs the court states that, "[w]e do not view the test enunciated by the 
Eighth Circuit as encompassing a complete review of all economic factors involved 
in a project", (Mem. Op. 24), only to be followed by the statement that''' 6-Jn order 
to fully comply an agency 'must reappraise the costs and benefits of the projec~ 
in light of the policies of environmental protection fmmd in NEPA. '". (Mem. Op. 
25). (Emphasis original). 
We can perceive no rationale for the decision of the court. Either the ca1-
culatinn of the benefits and costs of a project by an agency is reviewable by the 
court under the standards of section 101, as set forth by the Eighth Cirruit, or 
it is nut. No suggestion has been made by the appellants that the court should 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Neither have we suggested that 
the legislative process should be disregarded in the ultimate determination as to 
whether the project should go fonvard. 
However, the courts have a substantial responsibility to ensure that agency 
action in the calculation of costs and benefits is not "arbitrary'' and that it 
accords the vJeight to cnvirm1mental matters m.:mdated by NEPA. 
It cannot be disputed that the calculation of LOSts and benefits for a pro-
. ject is "agency actionn. The Aclministr::ttive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 706> 
provides that a revie1ving court trshal1: 
:----·----~-·-- -.-.------ ·>-----------------.-.--------- •. -:-~- :-:-: ·: ·~-=-~---~--- ::-:-=-=-=-~--------.-----. 
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(2) hold UJ1lawful and set aside agency actj on, 
findings and conclusions found to be -
(a) arbitrary, capricious, an abttsc 
of discretion or other ise not 
in CJ.cco:rdonce vJith la1..r; . • • or 
(c) in exc<3ss of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority or limitations, or short of 
statutory right. 
Under the Supreme Court decision in ~:-'cc~a!:]S,, s~!.§:., these criteria 11re-
• th • . c t t . fl D .,_ t. 1 . . II d lfn b • • qtnre e rev1evnng our _ o engage J_n a su s cm1 -la 1nqu:uy an a pro 1ng 1n-
depth review." 401 U.S. at 415. The immunization of the costs and benefits of 
the Tellico Project from judicial review by the district court (Ivfem. Op. 24) docs 
not comply with the requirements of Overton Park or those laid do'Wn by the Eighth} 
Fourth and District of Colwnbia Circuits. Indeed, the only possible review of 
a substantive agency determination as recognized by these Courts, inevitably 
nust involve a review of all the benefits and costs of the project since only 
when the benefits "exceed" the costs is the decision made to construct the project. 
At very least, the court is required, upon the presentation of competent evidence, 
to detennine whether the calculation of the costs and benefits of the project was 
conducted in a manner which was arbitrm:y or would tend to mislead those charged 
with the ultimate responsibility for approval of the project, or would give in-
sufficient weight to environmental values. Calvert Cliffs, ~· 
Tiris Court itself e:xpressed the necessity for review precisely in its pre-
vious opinion in these proceedings (468 F.Zd at 1180): 
••• government officials charged with making 
the future of the project are entitled to com-
prehensive, objective information concerning 
all of its benefits m1d costs before they de-
cide to give final approval to its consummation. 
(Emphasis the Court's). 
Precisely in this spirit, the appel1Qnts presente\1 substantial testimony 
at trial by tHo highly qualified witnesses concen1ing the benefits and costs of 
the Tellico Project. In each instance, the court foLmd their testimony "UI1Tcvicw, 
-....-.-.-.-----------.-.---.-----.- -------.---.·-·.·-·-' f-~----.---.-.-.---.----- ----.---. - - -~-: ::-,__ ._- - --.-
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4/ 
able under NEPA". (See Mem. Op. 24, n. 31). Dr. Joseph Carroll, a transporta-
tion economist who participated in the economic evaluation of the Tellico Project 
in the mid-1960's as an employee of TVA, testified with respect to the calculation 
5/ 
of navi~ation and flood control benefits for the project.- Dr. Paul E. Roberts, 
an economist at the University of Florida who has published extensively in the 
area of environmental economics, testified with respect to other aspects of the 
calculation of benefits and costs for the project, using only the data supplied 
by TVA. In both cases, the testimony related directly to the standard of review 
under section 101 of NEPA adopted by the Eighth, Fourth and District of Columbia 
circuits as to ''whether the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck 
was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values." Their 
testimony also related directly to the requirement set forth by this Court that 
the responsible officials receive "comprehensive, objective information concerning 
all of' !the project's] ·.:enefits and costs before they decide to give final approval 
to its consurrnnation". 468 F.2d at·llSO.· 
For example, Dr. Carroll testified that the purported navigation benefits 
6/ 
for the project of $400,000 annually- were "illusory" and "non-existent" and that 
their inclusion as an·economic justification were purely "arbitrary". In support 
thereof, the appellants filed :i.n evi~ence several doct.nnents prepared by Dr. Carroll 
during his employment with TVA that disputed the inclusion of navigation benefits 
The basis for the immunization from review is unclear. To ~.e extent it is based upon Senate Document 97, the decision clearly is in error. See Mem. Op. 21, n. 28 and Mem. Op. 31. The appellants presented evidence 
at trial, in the form of TVA's own documents, that TVA is not bound by S. Doc. 97 (Ex. 40). 
5/ The benefit - cost display for the project is set out in the EIS (Ex. 21) 
at page I -1-49. 
•. 6/ Ex. 21 (EIS), page I-1-49. 
!: 
~----:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-::--. ~::-:-:-:-:-:<-:-::-:-:-:-: --- ---- :<-:-:-:-:-:-:-:- -_-_-_.., 1-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:- ·-:-:·:-:-:-: -···-
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for the Te1J ico Proj cc'L based upon the g;uideJ.incs set forth for tJJe calcul<:ttion 
of such benefits in Senate Document 9'/. In addition~ Ex_hibit 39 clearly sllOh'S 
that tJJc navigation benefits for tJ1e p:coject vJere concr:-:i_ved aJld calmlated 111 a 
maru1.cr designed specifically to enhance the economic justification for ~che project 
rather thrm to analyze critically \-Jhet:her such benefits actually exist. 'I11e 
statement of l>ir. Nichols of TVA that "[w] e think our basic dis~g1·ecment 1s: TI1e 
paper IPr. Carroll_' s criticism of navigation benefits (Ex. 37) J purports to prove 
that lve couldn 1 t do something that had to be done," is particularly revealing. 
As testified to by Dr. Carroll, this statement reflected a basic attitude on the 
part of the navigation branch of TVA that they were required to devise a monetary 
value for navigation benefits in order to justify the project \viti1out regard to 
the application of sound economic principles. As stated by Dr. Carroll in Exhi-
bit 37, p. 19: 
it must be concluded that the navigation benefits 
attributed to the Tellico Project are illusory. The savings per acre concept upon which these benefits are based is both conceptually w1sound 
::md improperly applied. The use of this con-
cept is inconsistent <:ii th sourc_d economic analysis. 
Dr. Carroll's critique of the Tellico Project navigation benefits was pre-
pared in 1964. At no time subsequent to that document has TVA modified the pur-· 
ported $400,000 annual navigation benefit or applied the sound economic analysis 
suggested by Dr. Carroll during his employment with TVA. To the contrary, the 
appellees have refused consistently to depart from the unsound and arbitrary 
methods of calculation devised ln the early 1960's, and ~1ave consistently rep~e­
sented the navigation benefits of the project as being $400,000 annually. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this compelling testimony by a professional trans-
portation economist and former employee of TVA 1vho h'as -::mgaged in the economic 
analysis for the Tellico Project that the calculation of nJvigation benefits was 
"arbitrary'', the ilistrict court 1vho1ly clisrcgarc1cd the .·iJencc presented. 
Similarly, \vith respect to the calct1lation of flood control benefits fm: the 
-~-=-=·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:<-:-:-:-:-:-., ~::-::-:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-: . - ---. -- -:-:-:-:-::-:-:- f:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:,:- ··- ·----.---- --- -----------:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:.., t=::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-.-.-.-.·--.-
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7/ 
project, Dr. Caroll testified that they were inflated and inconsistent 1,:ith sound 
ecnnomic theort since they wholly disregarded the fund:~mental principle of diminish-
ing margi.'l.al utility. Ir ..d·~ed, Dr. CarToll testified that, using TVA's method of 
calculation, the sarne fit,JllTe for flood control lJenefi ts would exist even if the 
entire dmvnstream area t.verc completely protected from flooding prior to tJ1e con-
struction of the Tellico Project. Exhibit 37, pages 21-22 s.2ts forth Dr. Carroll's 
basic position v1i th respect to the inflated flood control benefits calculated by 
TVA. Once again, in spite of Dr. Carroll's fllildamental criticism of the method 
of calculating such benefits, 1VA has continued to maintain that the flood control 
benefits for the project amount of $505,000 annually. In addition, nowhere in 
the EIS (Ex. 21) for the project is the methodology for calculating such benefits 
set forth. Dr. Carroll testified that this was a significant omission from the EIS 
since it precluded an objective review of the calculation of flood control benefits 
by the ultimate decisionmakers for the project. Dr. Carroll further testified 
that, in his professional opinion, the EIS does not contain an objective analysis 
of the benefits and costs of the Tellico Project. 
Onc.e again, however, in spite of DT. Carroll 1 s unequivocal testimony as to the 
arbitrary and non-objective consideration of the benefits and costs for the pro-
. ject, his testimony was utterly disregarded by the district court and follild to 
be "unreviewable". We submit that, under the standards of the AdrninistTative 
Pi·ocedure Act and the Eighth, Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits, such a 
detenn.ination is reversible error. 
Dr. Paul E. Roberts also testified with respect to the benefit-·cost analysis 
conducted by 1VA for the Tellico Project. Ws testimony related principally to the 
7/ Estimated by TVA to be $505,00- mua11y. (Ex. 21 (EIS)~ p. I-1-49). 
.. 
!.. ~.~.-.-.-~~---·--.---.- .-.--- --------.-----•• -.---_-_______ _ 
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conclusions set forth on page I-1-49 of the EIS (Ex. 21) and the methodology of 
calculating project benefits partially set forth in volume III of the EIS (pp. 
III-3-1 to III-3-24). Of particular importance to Dr. Roberts' testimor1y was the 
footnote on page I-1-49 of the EIS which states: 
1. Detailed economic information is provided in Volume III. The values used throughout this 
statement are based on a 1968 analysis using then 
current prices for both benefits and costs. The power benefit was increased from $290,000 in 1971 
on the basis of substantial recent increases in 
costs of generating power. All other benefit values 
are as calculated in 1968. Since 1968, inflation 
and other factors have increased the project cost 
estimate to $69 million, or an equivalent annual 
cost of $2,835,000. No detailed re-evaluation of project benefits has been made but such an evalua-tion would be expected to show increases generally proportionate to project cost increases and the benefit-cost ratio would remain about 3:1. (.Bnphasis 
added). 
Dr. Roberts testified, first, that with respect to the underscored portion 
of the footnote, it was purely conclusory and could not possibly be supported by 
sound economic theory. He stated that the bare conclusion simply could not be 
made, in the absence of detailed economic re-evaluation (which TVA admits they 
have not done since 1968), that a current evaluation 'would be expected to show 
increases generally proportionate to project cost increases •.• " Dr. Roberts 
,. testified that the conclusions reached were not supported by any methodology set 
forth in the EIS, and could amount to nothing more than pure guesswork • 
.. 
. The importance of this testimony and of TVA's own admissions in the footnote 
canr1ot be overemphasized. They go directly to the question whether the methods 
for calculating the costs and benefits for the project were arbitrary in light 
of the standards imposed by section 101 of NEPA and whether t.he district court under-
took the "searching and careful" review required by NEPA. We submit that the court 
failed its responsibility by excluding all of Dr. Roberts' testimony from con-
sideration. (JMem. Op. 24, n. 31). 
On a related matter, Dr. Roberts testified that the estimated costs for the 
·-·-.·,·.·-· :----. .-.-.-.-.--·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·---" ~:-:--:-:-:-:-:-:-: ·-:-:-~-:-·-.-.·.·.·-·_-.-
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Tellico PTojcct had rlscn from $42 m5llion to $09 million Juring the period 1S66 
to 1969, but during the period 1969 to 1973 they had not risen by a single dollar. 
His t::;timony was uncontradicted, and was supported b;" 'TVA's mm budget submissions 
to the CongTess during that period. (Exs. 45,46,47,48). Dr. Roberts characterized 
such a situation as nimpossible' 1 , particularly in light of the va:;t inflationary 
spiral which has been experienced over the past four years. He testified further 
that nothing in sound econonuc theory or ex-perience could justify a failure to 
increase the estimated project costs beyond $69 million, particularly in light of 
the $27 million increase experienced during the years 1966 to 1969 and the lower 
rate of inflation which was prevalent during that period . 
.. 
Nevertheless, the court belmv wholly disregarded this testimony of Dr. 
Roberts. Once again, we submit that such an utter disregard of evidence directly 
relevant to the issue of the arbitrary and unreasonable action of the appellees 
is Dt direct odds with the requirement of "searching and careful" inquiry into 
all the costs and benefits as set forth by the Eighth, Fourth and District of Colum-
bia Circuits, and as recognized by this Court in its previous opinion. 468 F.2d 
at 1180. 
Of particular relevance in this regard is the discussion in Sierra Club v. 
Froehlke, su:era, 5 ERC at 1087: 
During approximately the last four years, the 
national annual consumer price index increase 
varied betvveen 4. 2 percent ond 6. 0 percent, 
whereas the reported index variation in the 
Dallas metropolitan area vaTied between 3.0 
and 6.5 percent annually. (citations omitted). 
Such cost of living increases do not generally 
comport with the percentage increases in es-
timated costs of the projects reflected in the 
tables. 
In spite of the large annual increases in 
costs, the benefit-cost ratio of e~ch of 
the projects in question generally has not 
changed. The apporcnt reason for this 
situation is that claimed benefits have 
been escalated by the Corps at the same rate 
- •. 
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as the costs. 
* * 
While it might be reasonable to escalate 
claimed benefits at the same rate as the 
general area cost-of-living increase, such 
escalation to offset those price increases 
due solely to the cost-of-living changes, 
there is no indicated basis in the record 
for escalating_them at a higher rate. 
Obviously, the increases in claimed bene-
fits in this instance are almost precisely 
the same as the increased costs, thereby 
preserving the project's benefit-to-cost 
ratio at 1.5 to 1. 
The reason for this Court's concern in this 
area is that a valid favorable benefit-cost 
ratio combining all facets of a project must 
represent the final synthesis of technical, 
economic and environmental factors. Any 
major changes on either the cost or benefit 
side of any of these factors can alt~r sub-
stantially the premise upon which a final 
decision by the agency and Congress was based 
approving a given project. .kcordingly, if 
there were an increase in economic "benefits", 
unless there was a proportional increase in 
environmental benefits, the possibility exists 
that economic benefit increases alone could be used to override increased environmental 
costs in a manner contrary to the intent of 
Congress. \Vhat must not be overlooked is the 
priority assigned by Congress to environmental 
factors under NEPA. As this Court understands 
this body of law, protection of the environment 
is now veiwed as paramount, and it is not to be 
placed on an equal footing with the usual econo-
mic and technical factors. See Citizens to Pre "" 
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
Dr. Roberts further testified that the inclusion of secondary benefits for 
the project appearing at page I-1-49 of the EIS without a similar calculation of 
secondary costs was unreasonable. He stated that a number of secondary costs would 
be associated inevitably with the claimed secondary benefits of "enhanced employ-
ment" and that the failure to calculate such secondary costs would deny·a decision-
maker the opportunity evaluate objectively the true costs and benefits of the 
'project. Once again, this testimony was disregarded by the district court. 
Dr. Roberts further testified that, while the appellees took credit in their 
t=:=:=·=::::-:-:-:::-:,:·-·.· -- ----- :-:~:-:-:-:<-:-; ·:--:-::-:-:-::--:-::-:-:-·----.-.-.--· 
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benefit-cost analysis for certain ''cnviromncni l benefits" for tbe project, .such 
as nrecreation" and "fish a'ld wilcUifen, they utterly failed to include in the 
hen· fit-cost m1alysis any cnviromnental costs association with the project. (Ex. 21 
. J 
ticularly relevant to this subject: 
TI1e basic pToblem w1derlying the benefit-
cost procedures in environmental cases is one 
of inclusion of such "benefits" 311d ncosts". Selected enviromnentally-Telated "benefits" have been identified by the Corps and "qucm-
tified' 1 • That is, they have been given a dollar-and-cents value and included as jus-
tification for building sorre of the projects in the Trinity master plan including lVallis-
ville. Yet, similarly situated environmentally 
related features which would appear to be 
"costs" in that they would be irreparably lost by construction of a given project, have not been included or qu311tified at all. In some 
cases these losses are identified, but in 
this context mere disclosure is insufficient. 
Last of all, some of the quantified factors 
characterized as 11benefi ts" would seem to be 
open to considerable question. 
The testimory of Dr. Roberts was directed precisely to th~ deficiencies in 
current procedures described by the coLrrt in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, st~EE.~· and 
1vas directly applicable to the identical clefecti ve procedures employed by TVA in 
the Tellico Project. Nevertheless, it was disregarded by the court below·. 
Finally, Dr. Roberts testified that the use of a 100-y :r project life c:wd 
the employment of a 314% discow1t rate for evaluating project costs and benefits 
't-vas lllreasonable and arbitrary under current practices since it would inevitably 
inflate the project ben::'fi ts and deflate the project costs. Directly on point 
on this issue is the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Alabama in Montgomerz v. Ellis, (N .. D. Ala., Sept. 11; 1973) » (attached 
as Rxhibi t A) . In that case~ the Depart111ent of Agriculture he1d empJ c: :m iden-
tical 3!4% discount rate and 100-ycar proj cc:t life in ev::-tluating the be and 
costs of a stream chJJ-:tnelizc~tion project, On motion for SUlllll~ary juclg,, ~md 
----------------:-:-:-:-:-:-:::-::;1 ·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:--------- ----- :-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:- 1-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:->>:·:-:-:-:-~-:-:-:-: ~------ -_ :-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: :-:-:-:-:-:------------------------.-
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based upon the affidavit of the S2Jne Dr. Paul E. Roberts who testified in the pre-
sent case, the court held as a m::.ltte-~· of law that the use of such figures was 
arbitrary as a matter of lc:nv Lrnde:r current economic ccnditions. TI1e Cou1·t held 
at pp. 23-24 of the opinion: 
. ' It is, thu::;} the oplnlon of the Court that the SCS, in employing a project life that is no longer CUITent and on inteTest rate that is 
extremely lm.,r by modern standards, has itiled 
to give effect to the reqLLirements of section 101 of J'..'EPA that all agencies of the Federal 
Governrnent shall exercise a continuing policy 
and continuing responsibility Wlder NEPA re-garding projects that might affect the en-
vironment. 
Defendants claim, however, that ··the courts 
cannot review a benefit-cost determination and, 
thus, attempted to insulate the use of a com-
putation based on such historic figures from judicial review. In this aspect of the case, 
_however, the Court feels that the f1.mction of 
the judicial branch is othenvise and that this is established by sound appellate dedsions to 
the effect that the courts have the right -
and indeed the responsibility - to review any 
arbitrary or capricious acbinistratl ve agency determination or, U.!ider ;-JEPA, one that gives 
insufficient consideration to environmental 
values. 
As applied to the instant case,the SCS cannot 
strike an arbitrary balance of benefits and costs by use of such an unreaUs tic interest rate a..11d project life, and, further, it must assign approp-
riate values to the environmental losses, some of 
which have been noted in the EIS, that will occur 
as a result of the project. Only in this way may 
the true costs of the project be balanced against 
tl1e net benefits claimed from it, as is required by NEPA and the decisions inteiTJTcting it. 
We submit that Montgomery v. _§llis is controlling in the present case, and, for 
that reason alone y a..n injunction should issue against further construction o£ 
the Tellico Project. 
The court belohl cited Mont:;ome_0....:_ v . .§llis as being contradictory to its inter-
pretation of section 101 of ;\EPA. (Mcm. Op. 24). ri1ms, the issue is cle;:1rly 
joined, aJ1.d we submit 
·-··•·' L•.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .. -·.·.-.-.·.---.-.-.---.--------·-· 
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the scope of judicial review under section 101 of NEPA as set forth by the pre-
vailing authorities. In this regard, ~fontgomery v. Ellis does not stand alone. 
In Sierra Club v. Froehlke, supra, at 5 ERC 1091, the district court stated: 
It should be ax1omatic that an artificially 
long projected life span for a project in-
volving combin~ environmental economic 
'benefits and costs' would be unacceptable 
under NEPA; the resulting (benefit-cost) 
ratio would be artificially high, thus 
suggesting a false 'balancing' beuveen 
technical, economic, and environmental 
factors. 
We submit that the failure of the court below to consider the evidence relating 
to project life and discount rate is patently incorrect, and amounts to reversible 
error. 
2. 
The District Court Failed to Require a Reevalua-
tion of the Benefits and Costs of the Project Subsequent to the Enactment of NEP.\ and Thereby Committed Reversible Error by Disregarding 
Evidence Presented Thereon. 
In its initial opinion in these proceedings, this Court set forth its require-
ment for the "reconsideration of the (Tellico) project in light of the provisions 
of section 101 . • . " ~68 F. 2d 1183-1184. A similar requirement for review 
under section 101 was enunciated by the Eighth Circuit in Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Froehlke, supra, 473 F.2d at 356: . 
To fully comply with NEPA, the Corps must 
· reappraise the costs and benefits of ~ 
project in light of the policies of envi-
ronmental protection found in i'i"EPA. As 
we.have stated, a decision to proceed 
with channelization is reviewable in the 
District Court to determine whether the 
actual balance of costs and benefits struck 
by th~ agency according to the standards of 
Sections 101 and 102 was arbitrary or clear-
ly gave insufficient weight to environmental 
factors. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, unless the requirements of this Court and of the Eighth Circuit are 
to be disregarded, an agency must conduct a full and detailed reevaluation of the 
:-:~:-:-:-:-:-:-: 
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benefits and costs of a project in light of the policies for environmental pro-
tection fOtmd in NEPA ln order to comply fully with the Act. 
In this regard, the appellees, by their own admission, are in violation of 
NEPA. A.s set out above, footnote one on page I-1-49 of the EIS (Ex. 21) states 
that: 
No detailed re-evalua_tion of p1=ojcc!_benefit~ 
has been made [ since lSW] but such an evalua-
tion would be eArpected to show increases general-
ly proportionate to project cost increases ... (Emphasis added). 
This evidence was not developed by the appellants, but, rather, w<ls included 
in the appellees' Olin EIS for the project and was uncontradicted at trial. It 
constitutes an acbnission, beyond dispute, that the agency has failed utterly to 
undertake a searching analysis of purported project benefits since the enactment 
of NEPA on January 1, 1970. Moreover, combined with the undisputed evidence that 
the costs for the prC:• ect have remained frozen at $69 million since 1969 and that 
no envirorunental costs are included· in the benefit-cost analysis, we submit that 
the evidence constitutes grounds for summary reversal. TI1e only conclusion which 
can be dra1v11 from the uncontradicted evidence is that the agency has blandly ig-
nored the requirements of NEPA and has been pitifully lmresponsive to the poLc:ies 
of environmental protection set forth in section 101 of NEPA. This pattern of 
behavior was ignored and found unreviewable by the court below; we do not believe 
the courts are so powerless to act in the face of agency laxity or intransigence. 
3. 
The District Court Failed to Apply the Re-
quirements for Mitigation as a Basis for 
Review Under Section 101 and Thereby 
Cornmi tted Revers 5 ;;le Error. 
As set out previously in this brief, the district court in Sie::cra Club v. 
Froehlkc, _SUJ~~' 5 ERC 1033, 1065-1066, adopted the requirement of mitigation as 
a basis for review UJ1dcr ~~ection lOt of NEPA. As stated by the court (S El~C 1066): 
-···-·.·-·.·.-- :-:.:-:-~-=~ !":-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:->>:.·:-:-:·: -:-::.:-:-:-.···:-:-:-.-- ::---:-·- ------ ·-· :-:-:-:-:-:-:-: ~:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-·-:-:-·--- -- .. - .. -.--.-
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(the courts) should not hesitate to require further agency consideration when a project 
appears to call for mitigation and yet none 
was considered, or only a half-hearted ef-fort was made. 
The appellants presented evidence with respect to the mitigation requirement 
.. 
which showed that the appellees, at very best, had made only a half-hearted effort 
to incorporate mitigation plans into the Tellico Project. These plans consisted 
of two efforts: (1) the placing of a dike around historic Fort Loudoun in order 
to preserve it from inundation, and (2) the filling of the Cherokee village site 
of Chota and reconstruction of two buildings. 
The appellants presented evidence ·through ~rr. Mack f~ichard, the State Archaeo-
logist of the State of Tennessee, that both Fort Loudoun, the first British set~le­
ment west of the Appalachian Mountains, and the Cherokee village sites of Chota-
Tenasi were presently included on the National Register of Historic Places. Mr. 
Prichard further testified, and the appellees do not dispute, that several other 
irnporta~t Cherokee village sites of Chota-Tenasi were presently included on the 
National Register of flistoric Places. Mr. Prichard further testified, and the 
appellees do not dispute, that several other important Cherokee village sites \rill 
be inundated by Tellico Reservoir. Mr. Prichard testified that the construction 
of a dike around Fort Loudoun would remove it from its historic river setting, 
and that the walls of the dike would be higher than the stockade itself, thus 
destroying much of the present view from the Fort. This evidence was uncontradicted. 
With respect to the filling of the site of Chota, Mr. Prichard testified that 
it would merely substitute an inundation of earth for an inundation of water, and 
in no \vay could be considered a preservation of the original village site. Except 
for the introduction of photographs showing the dirt fi11 above Chota rising out 
• of the waters of Tellico Reservoir and the reconstructed building and parking lots, 
~rr. Prichard's testimony was uncontradicted by appellees. In none of the evidence 
· ·presented did it appear that the Cherokee Indians, either eastern or we stem bards, 
---:-:-:-:-: 
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approved of such a "restoration". Indeed, the resolution of the Eastern Band in 
opposition to the Tellico Project is still in effect. 
Nowhere in the EIS cr in the other evidence presented do there appear plans 
for ameliorating the historical losses to be occasioned by the inundation of the 
remaining Cherokee village sites or the destruction of thousands of acres of wild-
life life habitat, fish habitat and agricultural lands. Nm·;;1ere in the EIS is 
thorough and searching inquiry given to a smaller reservoir which would mitigate 
these impacts, or to the development of additional comparable game and fish habitat 
elsewhere in the TVA system. 
This evidence was wholly disregarded by the court below, just as the fundamental 
requirement of judicial review of mitigation plans ·was disregarded contrary to 
Sierra Club v. Froehlke. The judicial review of such plans for mitigation is 
critical since, as expressed by the Eighth Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Froehlke, suora, 473 F.Zd at 351: 
The proposed mitigation plans go to the very 
heart of the question before the Corps in 
preparing its environmental impact state-
ment -- whether the project should proceed 
at the present time in view of its environ-
mental consequence. 
The evidence clearly shows that the appellees, at most, have made only a 
half-hearted attempt to mitigate the massive impacts of the Tellico Project and 
the court below, in failing to require mo!e, committed reversible error. 
II. 
TI-ffi DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
TIIAT 11-IE Ei'#IRQ~,ffi~TAL DlPACT STATDffiNT FOR 
TI-IE TELLICO PROJECT CQ\lPLIES WITH 
SECfiON 102(2)(C) OF ~~PA 
This Court, in its initial opinion rendered in these proceedings, established 
• a rigorous standard for compliance with the provision of section 102 (2) (C) of 
NEPA, 43 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(C). The Court stated (468 F.Zd 1175, 1176); 
Section 102, then, by establishing specific 
procedures to ·be followed, makes it pos-
sible for courts to detennine objectively 
whether federal officials have carried 
. -.--. -·--.-.-.·-·.- ->~-:---·-:->:-o 
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out the m::md;-tLc of Cr)TJ::J,Toss to accord a h:igL priority to cnviron~cntal factors. 
~:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::--:------.---.·.<-:-~-=-= ----- .• 
It will be observed that the only 13Jlgungc in 
sect·on 102 that could conceivably be rc~d as qualifying the specific directives contained therein is the pl1Tasc 'to the full est extent possible' . Hoh·ever, 'this lan~::;u:1ge does not provide an escape hatch for foot dragging agen-
cies; it does not make i\JEPA's procedural re-quirements somehm; discretionary.' (Citing Calvert Cliffs at 449 F.2d 1114). 
Among the procedures required to be follmv-ed be agencies pursuant to section 
102 is the preparation of a detailed environmental impact statement under section 
102(2) (C). Without exception the courts ha'Je held that the requirements of section 
102(2XC) are stringent and rigorous. For example, in Calvert Cliffs, ~ra, 449 F.2d 
at 1114, the District of Columbia Circuit stated that: 
To ensure that the balancing analyses is carried 
out and given full effect, Section 102 (2) (C) re-quires that rcspon~ible officials of all agencies prepare a 'detailed statement' covering the impact 
of particular actions on the environment, the en-
vironmental costs h'hich might be avoidc:d, and 
alternative measures which might alter the cost-benefit equation. The apparent purpose of a 'de-tailed statement' is to aid in the agencies' own decisionmaking process and to advise other inte-
rested agencies and the public of the enviTonmental consequc:nces of planned federal action. Beyond the 
'detailed statement', Section 102(2)(D) requires 
all agencies specifically to 'study, develop and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended 
courses of action in any proposal which involves 
unresolved conflicts concerning al ten1ative uses 
of available resources. ' Tilis requirement, like the 'detailed statement' requirement, seeks to 
ensure that each agency decision maker has before him and takes into proper accow1t all____Eossibl~ 
approaches to a particular project (including total abandonment of the project) which would 
alter the environmental impact and the cost-benefit balance. Only in that fashion is it likely that the most int.e lligent, optim21Jy beneficial decision 1·1ill be made. (Emphosis 
added). 
In a case cited extensively 11ritl1 approvJl by this Cuurt in its ]nitial deci·~ 
sion, Environmental Defense flmd v. Cml!S of Enginc~-c::;, 32S F, Supp. 7:~8~ 749 
;--:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:---- - :-:-:-:-~-:-.: f:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-: ~~ -·-: - - -- - ---·----.. . --·. -. -.-.-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-::-: -:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-.:-:-:---· -·- --· ·---·-.·.-----------
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(E.D. Ark. 1971) the die:;trict court stated that (325 F. Supp. at '759): 
At the very least NEPA is zm environmental full disclostlr-c la'>'~" 
The 'detailed statcmccntr required by Sec. 102(2) (C) should, ot a minimuTil~ contain 
such i nformat_ion as will alert the r-rc-
sidcnt ~ the Council on Envi-rorunental Quali tj, the: public, and, indeed 5 the Congress, to all kno~-.rn :e_oss_~blc:__ environ-
mental consequences of proposed agency 
action. (Emph;_'LSis original). 
In SierTa Club v. FroehH:-e, ~' 5 ERC at 1067, set forth a similar standard 
for compliance with section 102(2) (C): 
A reasonable test would be the same as that adopted by present Corps regulations: an impact statement 
should contain 'all possible sienificant effects on the environment.' 
In substantial contrast to the standards adopted by the foregoing authoriti:::s, 
the court below adopted a legal standard of sufficiency much less rigorous th2,n 
those adopted by other courts. At page 6 of the Memorandum Opinion, the court 
stated that rv (a)n impact statement rmJst disCL· ; in detail the significant enviTon-
mental impacts resulting from the proposed project. 11 In adopting the stzmdard, 
the Court erroneously relied upon Sierra Club v. Froehlke, supra, for the conclusion 
regarding the legal sufficiency of the EIS. As set forth just above in this brief, 
the court in Sierra Club v. Froehlke reqaired that an impact statement cciltain an 
evaluation of "all possib_--~ significant effects on the environment," while the cou.Tt 
below required only a consideration of "the significcmt impacts resulting from the 
proposed proj cct." The difference is not merely a distinction, for the requiTement 
emmciated by the court in SierTa Club forces an age . :y to engage in a process of 
reasonob1e predir 1. of environmental impacts~ while the standard adopted by the 
Court--below, as L ,·vidence shows, requires mcrc1y an exmnination of the most 
obvim1 ·Tq)acts 1n a qtwntitativcly imprc::;.:>jvc but qualitatively rne2Dlingless 
fashj, :orcovcl', even if the stancbrd adop L:cd by the cow·t below c::m be con· 
~:-::--:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:------- -- .. --- ;-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-- :-:-:-:-:-:~ 
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sidercd adequate under NEPA, the evidence shows that the EIS falls far short of 
rreeting even this less rigorous criterion. An examination of several areas in 
which evidence was presented as to the inadequacy of t-.hP. EIS will verify this con-
elusion. 
1. Shoreline Development 
The Tellico Project is an economic development project, and is specifically 
d, ,_;igned, planned and predicted to attract substantial new industry to the area 
along with thousands of new residents. In the EIS for the project, TVA predicts 
that the project will create 25,000 new jobs during its first 25 years of opera-
tion. (EIS p. I -1- 2). In its benefit-.cost analysis, TVA takes credit for this 
"enhanced employment" as a secondary benefit of the project, without calculating 
any secondary costs associated therewith. (EIS p. I -1-49). Perhaps the most re-
vealing statement concerning the project is contained on the Summary Sheet of ~1e 
EIS (the first unumbered page of Volume I). There TVA states that 11 (t)he action 
consists L:f the construction of a darn and reservoir on the Little Tennessee River 
in east Tennessee. The project lvill include related industrial, commercial, resi-
dential, and recreational development." (fmphasis added). 
From this candid desc.ciption of the project, it would be expected that the 
EIS would examine in detail the environmental consequences of such "industrial, 
commercial, residential and recreational" activities since they are an integral part 
of the project as defined by TVA. Indeed; such an examination is required by 
NEPA. Section 101 of the Act e:A'Presses the profound Congressional concern with 
''pq;ulation growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource 
exploitation," and related matters. 
'The current Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality se·tting forth 
tl1e required content of an EIS provide that (38 Fed. Reg. 20553; Sec. 1500.8(a]: 
The foJlowing points are to be covered: 
Agencies should also take care to identify, as 
appropriate, popul3tion and growth characteris-tics of the affected area and any population and growth impacts resulting from the proposed action 
·::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:- ··--·- ·.·.------------· 
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and its alternatives (sec paragraph (a)(l) (3) (iii), of this section). In discvssing these population aspects, agencies should give 
consideration to u~;ing the rates of growth in the region of the project contained in the projection compiled for the Water Resources Council by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
of the Department of Commerce and the Eco-
nomic Research Service of the Department 
of Agriculture the ''OBERS" projection. In any event it is essential that the 
sources of data used to identify, quantify 
or evaluate any and all envirorunental con-
sequences be expressly noted. (2) The relationship of the proposed ac-tion to land use plans, policies, and controls for the affected area. This requires a dis-
cussion of how the proposed action may con-form or conflict with the objectives and 
specific terms of approved or proposed Federal, State, and local land use plans, policies, and controls, if any, for the 
area affected including those developed in 
response to the Clean Air Act or the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. 1\~1ere a conflict or inconsistency 
exists, the statement should describe the 
extent to h'hich the agency has reconciled its proposed action with the plan, policy 
or control, and the reasons why the agency has decided to proceed notwithstanding 
the absence of full reconciliation. 
(ii) Secondary or indirect as well as primary 
or direct, consequences for the environment 
should be included in the analysis. f>Jany 
major Federal actions, in particular those that involve the construction or licensing 
of infrastructure investments (e.g., highvrays, 
airports, sewer systems, water resource projects, etc.), stimulate or induce secondary 
effects in the fonn of associated invesul'.ents 
and changes patterns of social and economic 
activities, S~1ch .seconclanr effects, through their inmacts on ex is tina comrr1ur1i t-yr facilities 
and activi·ties, throu~h including neh· facili-ties or throue,h changes in naturol conditions, 
may often be cven_more substantial than ~ primary effects of the oTigip-'~1 action itself_. For example, the effects of the proposed :J.c-tion on popul~ttion and _gro1\·th m.:1v bs: mnong the 
more signi fiS:_i_lll t ::::cconci3r\' effc~cts. Such __E!?jJU-_ lation and grol,'til inpacts shou lu be estimated if eAJ?CCtcd t_~~c significant (usinc; dat3 iden-tified 3.5 indicated in Sec. 1500.S(a) (1)) and an 
nssessmcnt m,1Je ot the effect of any pos-sib~e 
:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-
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chaJ1cr~ i~populntion patte·ms or gyowth upon 
the resource base, incJudinLland use, ·h·ater, 
and_public se:·vices! of the area i~1 question. 
In addition to the Guidelines of CEQ, the Courts have also required the de-
tailed consideration of the impacts of such project-induced factors as industriali-
zation, commercialization, land use shifts and the like. In Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 
supra, at 5 ERC 107 4, one of the principal bases for a finding that the EIS was 
inadequate came :in this area. The Court stated: 
Although there is reason to believe that there 
will be development, growth and :industrial ex-
pansion as a result of the Wallisville Pro-ject's prov:id ing of a dependable water supply, 
there is no impact evaluation of such expan-
sions, nor has its environmental 'cost' been 
considered. Not only has Congress detern1ined 
that this type of grovrth leads to increased 
pollution, but also Guidelines of the CEQ 
. and EPA point out that consideration to such 
hazards must be given. (Citing CEQ Guidelines 
36(a)(ii),(iii), 36 Fed. Reg. 7725 (1971); 
EPA Reg. 36.4S(b)(l), 37 Fed. Reg. 883(1972); 
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 433l(b)(S), and Envirorunental 
Defense Fund v. Coros of Engineers, 525 F. SL~P· 
-728, 748 (E.D. Ar~971)). 
This Court, itself, recognized the duty of giving detailed consideration to 
such factors in its earlier opinion, stating (468 F.2d 1176): 
This [requirement to minimize environmental 
harm] would encompass not only constant re-
evaluation of projects already begun to 
determine 1d1ether alterations can be made 
in existing features or whether there are 
al tenm ti ves to proceeding with projects 
as initially planned, but also the conside-
ration of the environmental impacts of all 
rroposed agency action. (Bnphasis original.) 
The district court found the treatment of the shoreline development :impacts 
of the project in th EIS to be adequate 0'1em. Op. pp. 13-15), stating, signifi-
cantly, that 11the treatment afforded this topic has been expanded from that in 
the draft statement and represents, as far :1s pncticable at the tjme the stat<:'nk~Tj~t_ 
was filed, a detailed discus::; ion. * * NEPA requires a certain aJl10LU1t of 
prediction; it docs not call for utter conjecture when with the passage of time a 
~:-:-:-:-:---------------- -- - ----- :-~-:-:-:-:--~-~- ·----- ______ -..:: 
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supplement can be provided." (Emphasis added.) The court then refers to a number 
of pages in the EIS where the discussion of shoreline development impacts was 
supposedly expanded. 
Two points must be made with respect to this holding by the court. In the 
first place, the requirements of section 102(2)(C) are not limited by a standard 
of "practicability." As stated by the District of Columbia Cixcuit in Calvert 
Cliffs, supra, 449 F.2d at 1114: 
Unlike the substantive duties of Section 101 (b) 
which require agencies to 'use all practicable 
means consistent with other essential conside-
rations,' the procedural duties of Section 102 
must be fulfilled, to the 'fullest extent pos-
sible.' 
Thus, by adopting a standard of 'practicability" under Section 102(2)(C) , the 
court violates the standards adopted in all other cases interpreting NEPA, and 
encourages bureaucratic laxity in the preparation of environ~ental impact state-
ments. 
Second, the appellants at no tL~e in the proceedings suggested that TVA engage 
in ''utter conjecture" in determining the environmental impact of shoreline de-
velopment. Nor is "utter conjecture" required to assess in greater detail the 
impacts of such development. TVA throughout these proceedings alluded time and 
again to the depth and breadth of its environmental expertise. It was able to 
predict with uncanny accuracy that the project would attract substantial industry 
and provide at least 25,000 jobs. It took credit for this enhanced employment in 
its benefit-cost analysis. In assessing the purported navigation benefits for 
the project it projected the attraction of both a chemical-metallurgical complex 
and a metal-working and paper complex to the project area. (EIS p. III-3-20,21). 
Yet at no place in the EIS did the appellees even attempt an assessment of the 
environmental impacts of the projected industrialization. The essence of their 
analysis appears at page I-1-33 of the EIS: 
(· 
~-
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TVA will prepare one ,or more supplcmcntcil en-
vironmcnt.:1l statc:;'e;lts, i1S appropriate, for development of lands around Tellico when de-taile-d proposals aTe completed. '§) 
Such a bland assurance harJiy amounts to the rigorous analysis required by 
section 102 of l\JEPA. It is apparent that, despite its wealth of e)..rpertise, TVA 
has taken the easy way out in assessing these impacts of the project. By doi1lg 
so, hov1ever, it has deprived the ultimate decisionTik'lkers of all relevant in£or-
mation concerning such impacts upon vlhich a rational decision can be ma.de regard-
ing the advisability of the project. 
TI1e evidence cleaTly establishes that the decisiorunakers need not be de-
prived of such info1mation, nor would the development of those data be an exer-
cise in ''utter conjectuTe". First of all, the CEQ Guidelines clearly contemplate 
and require that such infomtion be presented in an EIS. See discussion, supra. 
··- :-:-:-.:-: 
Second, the appellants evidence established that (1) such Lrnpacts were predict-
able and(2) that they were not set ·aut i1l.. the EIS. Dr. Edward Clebsch, an ecologist 
from tJ1e University of Tennessee, testified that the EIS failed to set forth the 
impacts of such shoreline development activities as air pollution, spills of toxic 
materials from barges, popu1ation shifts, sewage effluents, increased transportation 
use, farni1y relocation, and the impacts of the project on established comml11li ties 
in the area. Dr. Clebsch further testified that an assessment could be made 
of such impacts, and that, contrary to the assertion of TVA, such assessments need 
not be conditioned upon a precise knowledge of the precise industries which would 
locate in the area. 
Also of great importance 1n this area are the comments of the Environmental 
The additional references to shoreline development in the EIS are no moTe searching in tl1eir ::mo.lysis of these impacts. See l1!cm. Op. 14, n. 17, ruK1 pages cited tl1e1'cin. These inadequacies are dis :rsscd) infra. 
J: 
'! 
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Protection Agency and the ;\pp<1lachim1 Rcgiono1 Commission on the draft EIS~ and 
the responses of TVA thereto. T11c comments of EPA are criticoL (EIS p. I-3-1 
to I-3-11). At page I-3-1, EPA recommended the holdi::-:.~ of public hearings on 
the project. TVA responded that it ndoes not believe a public hearing would be 
desirable now since the project is nearly half completed." (EIS p. I-3-12). At 
pages I-3-9 and I-3-11 of the EIS, EPA commented that: 
The National Environmental Policy Act places the 
responsibility for consideration of the total 
effect on the environment of any given project 
directly on the ·Federal agency which is spon-
soring the action. Thus, the secondary effects 
of the project, such as the following, must be 
explored: 
A. Sbnrulated industrial and commercial development 
in the region considering the possible adverse 
environmental effects of such development . 
. . B. Expansion of urban areas, especially the Timber-
lake community, and their populations vvith ac-
companying demands on water resources, waste 
disposal syste:n, transportation, cmd other 
necessities of modern life. Particularly as 
to how the satisfaction of these dPmands af-
fects the quality of the environment in the 
region. 
The follm-.. ring are important to the qnali ty and effec-· 
tiveness of any environmental in." '.ct statement: 
A. Disct~sion of the accommodations that 1~11 be made 
for the relocation or protection of fmnilies, 
commercial business, public utilities, and indus-
tries which will be displaced or othenvise affected 
by the project should be addecl. Particularly, re-
ference should be made as to how these accormnoda-
tions affect the enviTomnent and the quality of life 
in the region. 
B. Scientific and engineering support for all conclu-
sions reached on the environmental consequences of 
tJ1e project should be provided. In addition, where 
scientific research studies are cited as supportive 
evidence they should be rcfercncc:.-d either in foot-
no1~es or in an appropriately indexed bibliography. 
TI1e response of TVA to this request for additional consideration of shoreline 
development impacts was silence in the final EIS. 
In addition to the formnl comments of EPA conce111ing the need for additional 
~:-:-:-:-:-=-~-::-:-:-·------- ---- =-~.:-:-:-~-:-:-:-:- .-:-:-:-:-:-:-:->:.:._-_. ______ _ ~:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-·-------
consideration of shoreline development impacts, Mr. Greer Tidwell, a staff member 
of the regional office of EPA with responsibility for reviewing the final EIS for 
the project~ testified that in the opinion of EPA ·the final EIS did not give suf-
ficient consideration to the impacts of shoreline development. Such evidence lS 
of substantial probative ·weight since EPA is peculiaTly equipped to formulate 
recommendations concerning erwirorimental matters. As stated by the district: court 
in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, supra, at 5 ERC 1072: 
When a conflict arises between the Corps and an 
·agency which is making an evaluation in its par-
ticular field of expertise, and when the Corps' 
evaluation is based upon factors of which the 
reviewing agency may take cognizance, then NEPA 
obligates the Corps in most instm1ces to defer 
to that evaluation. 
The comments of the Appalachian Regional Commission are equally revealing. 
At pages I-3-35 and 36.of the EIS the Commission recommends the inclusion of far 
greater analysis of the impacts of industrial development and related matters. 
The response of TVA is characteristic. At page I-3-38 of the EIS, TVA responds 
repeatedly that the information requested by the Coi'nrnission ·. :_u be provided in a 
"subsequent statement" dealing with "shoreline development." As a single example 
only, the Commission made the following request of TVA (EIS p. I-3-35): 
Industrial Development - Without adequate public 
controls industrial development can have many 
adverse environmental effects not treated in 
the statement. Although the statement mentions 
that ''TVA will not allow industrialization in-
con::.; .:;tent: with the overall environmental 
objectives of the project" and "development 
of these areas (including industrial) will be 
done in compliance with all applicable laws 
and regulations, including those applying to 
Federal agencies, and in accordance Hith high 
environmental protection, design and planning 
standards establishc;d by TVA", the statement 
does not amplify on these stondards. Specific 
standards and regulations would help assure 
protection of the visual environment, both 
from the water as well as from highways (U.S. 
411, for ex~unple). 1\ddi tional controls would 
improve the environmental aspects of this pro-ject in such· <1.rc<1s as the aTchitcctural tn~at-· jnent of buildings; set-back <md siteing of 
structures; insto.llation of utilities under-
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ground; stor8gc of materials; and elimination 
of any ch::mcc of hater pollution due to erosion 
durjJ1g site development, potential washing of 
debris into the lake, and hashing of oils, 
ch:;nticals, and other contc:m1inants into the 
lake. Docking facilities will be necessaTy. 
Without prior con~ddera tion of these aspects 
of projected industrial dcvelopment, our 
staff believes that adverse environmental 
effects will result. 
In response to these serious environmental considerations, nearly identical 
to those raised by EPA, TVA states that (EIS p. I-3-38), "(t)he type of infonnation 
requested in this comment will be made available in a subsequent statement dealing 
with shoreline development." 
This response, and the inadequacies of the EIS which it reflects, are patently 
insufficient under the stringent standards of section 102. If industrial develop-
ment is a part of the pro_iect, and TVA states that it is, then its environmental 
impacts should be evaJ: now. Waiting for a subsequent EIS to be issued "as 
appropriate" precludes 'tate consideration of the most serious and po·cntially 
irreversible impacts of t}le project until after it is completed. That is not 
the intent of NEPA. As stated appropriately by the District of Columbia Circuit 
in the recen. case entitled Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. AEC, 
_ _.;_F.Zd __ , 5 ERC 1418 (D.C. Ci-r. JW1e 12, 1973): 
It must be remeniliered that the basic thrust 
of an agency's responsibilities w1der !\TEPA is 
to predict the environmental effects of pro-
posed action before the action is taken and 
those effects fully known. Reasonable fore-
casting and speculation is thus implicit in 
NEPA, and we must reject any attempt by agen-
cies to shirk their responsibilities under 
NEPA by labeling any and all discussion of 
future environmental effects as 'crystal 
ball inquiry.' 'The statute must be con-
strued in light of reason if it is not to 
demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaning-
fully possible ~~ * * '. But implicit in this 
rule of reason is the overriding statutory 
duty of compliance with jnif:nct statement 
procedures to 'the'' fullest extent possible.' 
The appellants ask no more; they are entitled to no less. 
~-~~~-~~~:-~: ~~::-.--·-·- --- .. -. . . -. ----~---·~-... ------------~-----.·--.--- . - --- . - ;-::-:~:-:-::--------.·-:--·------.---. 
- 35 -
2. 
Ag_ricultural Losses 
~---~------ -:-:<·=-=·=·- --~----------~-- -:-::::-:-:::_:-:::-; 
The appellants presented subste:mtial evidence through Mr. Robert Sliger, t.he 
County Agent for Monroe County, Tennessee (one of the counties affected by the 
project), that the EIS presented inadequote and highly misleading infonnation with 
respect to the agricultural losses to be caused by the project. .Mr. Sliger testi-
fied that the project would inundate several thousand acres of Class I a."'ld II 
fannland, and would have a substantial impact on £ann-related business in the 
area. Such secondary impacts were not even mentioned in the EIS. He testified 
that the consideration given to agricult-ural losses at page I-1-31 of the EIS 
was based on oubvork data, and in no way reflected current conditions. For example, 
TVA stated that the"per-acre agricultural production in the area in 1964 was $48, 
and the figure is probably somewhat higher now". Mr. Sl~ger pointed out that the 
figure was, indeed, sorJewhat higher, averaging $290 per acre for corn, $1400 pe::-
acre for tobacco and $3200 per acre for tomatoes. Accordingly, in his opinion 
the EIS was vastly misleading in the area of agricultural losses, from the stand-
point of both direct and indirect income losses. Mr. Sliger testified that this 
was of substantial importance, since the project would be displacing existing 
and quantifiable agricultural production in a time of great need in return for a 
potential industrial complex> and that neither the long-term nor the transitional 
losses had been described completely or candidly in the EIS. 
Iri spite of this testimony by an expert witness intim&.tely familiar with the 
area and the impacts to be caused by the project, his testimony was apparently 
disregarded by the court below since it is not even mentioned in the Memorandum 
Opinion. That does not represent the kind of searching inquiry required of the 
courts by NEPA and, in addition, demonstrates clearly the lack of consideration of 
· 
1
'all enviroruncntal impo.cts" of the project required by NEPA. 
3. 
-- --~--- .-l: 
,,-
.\ 
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In addition to the eco1ogical changes wllich wiU ocrur as a result of the 
industrialization, commercial development and residc.ntial development of the Tellico 
area ~ee c-,ection 1, ~::-a] , other significant ecologic:::-.1 changc~s will be v.rrought 
as an immediate result of the impotmdJllent of ·water itself. Dr. Edward Clebsch 
testified 1vi t.h respect to many of these impacts which were ei thcr entirely omitted 9/ or given only cursory consideration in the Ers-:- As noted by the court below, Dr. 
Clebsch testified that TVA had failed to conduct a "more thorough ecosystem analy-
sis" for the Tellico Project. (M'em. op. 10). However, the court omitted reference 
to the testimony of Dr. Clebsch relevant to the importance of more thorough analy-
sis for the purposes of predic1.:ing ecological changes in the area. The court also .. 
failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Clebsch that highly sophisticated and 
arcane analyses were not important to a complete EIS, but that 1VA had failed to 
complete even the first step of such an 811alysis, that b(.;.ing a systematic survey 
of the species in the area likely to be affected by the project. 1\'hile he was 
aware of the partial survey conducted by 1VA and set forth in the EIS, it was his 
opinion that the survey was incomplete and of little value in predicting ecological 
change. He further testified, upon direct question by the court, that an adequate 
study of th0. area would contain substantially less pages than that included in 
the EIS for the roj ect, and that the EIS contained much extraneous and irrelevant 
material which added to its bulk but contributed little to its ultimate value as 
-' 
a study of the ecological impacts of the project. 
Dr. Clebsch testified that a significant omission of the EIS was a consiclera-
·tion of the areal extent and ecological and aesthetic impact of drawdowns of the 
reservoir during ·winter months. He further testified, based upon an affidavit sub-
9/ The district court's consideration of ecological impacts appcaT~; at pages 10-11 of the l\fcrnonmdwn Opin.:;_on. 
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mittccl by him earlier in the proceedings, that the EIS omitted discussion of the 
an1ow1t of soil which would be stripped of vegetation during construction, how long 
it would remain barren, a:;1d the amount of siltation which would be cnused by such 
activities. He testified that ~ew roa_cls, railroads and bridges were to be con-
structc -I as a part of the project, but that their impact upon the siltation, hydro-
logy and biological characteristic::; of affected streams 1·ms completely omitted from 
consideration. 
Dr. Clebsch stated that "certainly one of the environmental consequences of 
ti1e project is altered trm1sportation m1d land use ... but we are not provided 
with any but the most cursory and general evaluation of the environmental impact 
of these two factors." 
Finally, Dr. Clebsch testified uneqttivocally that the EIS does not "represent 
an objective, good faith analysis of the environmental impacts of the project." 
TI1e comments of the Department of the Interior on the draft EIS, and TVA's 
responses thereto, support the testimony of Dr. Clebsch. At page I-3-29 of the 
EIS~ the Interior Department stated that "(t)he description of the impacts of the 
project on fish and wildlife should include more detail on the impacts of these 
resources from the urban m1d industrial developments com1ected with the project." 
On page I- 3-30 of the EIS, the Interior Department again com..rnentecl that: 
The wildlife production in the planned urban area 
m1d the industrial areas will be sloHly replaced 
as these areas are developed. All relationships 
such as these should be described. 
The response of TVA was again characteristic. At page I-3-32 they stated 
that "(t)he portion of this comment dealing with urban and industrial develop-
mcnt will be treated in the subsequent statement issued by TVA on that subject." 
Thus, in spite of the fact that the urbm1, industrial and recreational areas have 
already been design:::tted by TV/\ on the project maps, <Jnd in spite of the fact that 
TVA has conf:idently predicted industrialization of the area as a result of the 
proj cct, they once again refuse to develop and divulge inforrnation requested by 
:----- ------·- ------.·_-___________ _ ,_ -------.- -~-~-=-=-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:~ ~: :-:-:-:-:-_ -:-:-:--
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a Federal agency respon_,;ible for the prcsen:ation and development of the fish and 
wildlife resources of this nation. We cannot conceive tlnt this ref-usal comports 
with the requirement of :';EPA that the cmrironmcntal jJnpacts of a project be analyz8'c1 
and disclosed "to the fullest extent possible." 
4. 
tlistorical Values 
Many of the unique and vahwble historical values to be destroyed by the 
Tellico Project are set outp::-eviously in this brief. In that regard, the plain-
tiffs presented the testimony of Mr. Mack Prichard, the State Archaeologist of 
the State of Tennessee. Mr. Prichard has studied extensively both the Cherokee 
village sites to be inundated by the project and the history of the Cherokee 
Tribe, both before and after its removal from the eastern United States on the 
infamous "Trail of Tears" 1n 1838. He testified at length and eloquently with 
respect to the historical value of the Little Tennessee River, setting forth in-
dividual descriptions of several of the Cherokee village sites to be destroyed 
and their historical significance. 
Mr. Prichard further testified that resolutions in opposition to the Tellico 
Proj ec had been adopted by the Easten1 Band of Cherokee Indians_ (Ex. 32), the 
Southeasten1 Indians Antiquities Association (Ex. 30), and the Tennessee State 
Archaeological Society (Ex. 16). Although tbe resolution of the Eastern Band of 
Cherokees was passed following the filing of the EIS, the others were adopted 
pr1or to that time, and Mr. Prichard testified that neither was mentioned in the 
EIS. He testified that this was a significant omission from the EIS since it 
-
reflected on its overall objectivity. 
Mr. Prichard testified that the discussion 1n the EIS concerning the loss 
of historical values in the o.rea was non--obj ectivc since it failed to describe in 
detail the historical importance of the area. That importance was reflected most 
recently in the inclusion of the ChoLl-TenJsi site on the National Register of 
Historic PlGces. (Ex. 29). He testif:ic:d that, in his professional opinion, the 
·=-~-=-:":--:--:-:-:-:-
i 
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EIS did not contain a detailed discussion of the cultural and historic significance 
of the project area and the impact of the project upon those values. 
The consideration given by the district court to tr~ testimony and to the 
10/ 
historical values of the area as treated in the EIS is meager. The emphasis of 
the court was almost entirely upon the archaeological work in the area, rather 
than upon the historical significance of the area. The appell2 . .r1ts do not dispute 
that considerable archaeological work has been undertaken in the project area. 
This work was aptly described by Mr. Prichard as "salvage archaeology" in view of 
the fact that the sites themselves and perhaps as ITUlch as 90% of the artifacts 
will be immdated by the reservoir. 
However, the critical issue is the consideration given in the EIS to what will 
be destroyed, rather than to what will be saved. Nowhere in the EIS does there 
appear a discussion of the historica1 value of the area _comparable to the des-
cription given by Mr. Prichard in his testimony. 
TI1e inquiry of the district court on this subject is no more searching than 
that of TVA. For example, at page 8 of the !-.lemorandum Opinion, the court states 
that, "Chota, a recently identified Cherokee village, will be presc1~ed through 
filling." In light of the testimony of Mr. Prichard, this statement represents 
an appalling misconception of the values of the area. In the first place, the 
site of Chota has been knmm for years. Second, Chota is not merely a "Cherokee 
village", but was the capital city of the Cherokees and the sacred city of refuge. 
Finally, the suggestion that it will be "preserved through filling" demonstrates 
the same misconception of its value to tl1e Cherokee culture as that exhibited by 
TVA. Chota will not be presenred; it will be buried by earth rather than by 
water and partly reconstructed on an island in the middle of the Tellico Reservoir. 
We cannot conceive that the court would have entertained a suggestion that the 
remaining registered historical sites in the United States could be "preserved 
through filling." 
10/ Mcm. Op. 7-9. 
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A second statement of the court below also warrants scrutiny. At page 9 of 
the Memorand~ Opinion the court states that: 
The controversy in this area concerned the 
emphasis to be placed on the loss. Little 
evidence was presented demonstrating a lack 
of disclosure on the part of TVA or a lack 
of objective analysis. 
Two points must be made. First, Mr. Prichard testified directly that the 
EIS did not contain an objective analysis of the historical losses to be caused 
by the project. Second, it is true that much of the evidence related to the matter 
of the "emphasis to be placed on the loss." That evidence was presented for good 
reason, sir1ce the question of "emphasis" is the very essence of the requirement for 
objectivity and disclosure "to the fullest extent possible." In the absence of a 
complete and accurate disclosure of the ·historical significance of the area to be 
destroyed, the ultimate decision makers are deprived of the essential facts neces-
sary to a rational decision. If, for example, the proposal were made to destroy 
the site of Jamestown, Virginia, without emphasizing its historical significance, 
the decision to proceed would be made u1 the dark. The same is true here. It is 
safe to say that the Congress and the public generally are not aware of the 
historical significance of the Cnerokee village sites along the Little Tennessee 
River. In the absence of emphasizing their importance in the EIS, a rational 
decision with respect to their preservation or destruction is made impossible. 
Since the EIS affords no suc11 emphasis and full disclosure, it does not meet the 
stringent requirements set forth in section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. 
5. 
Water Quality 
The Appellants offered considerable testimony at trial on the st1bject of 
water quality. This testimony and evidence was offered for the twofold purpose 
of demonstrating that (a) the construction and operation of the Tellico Project 
would violate \vater quality standards and the requirements of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C., Sections 1323, et ~-),and (b) that the Ap-
- 41 -
pellces' discussion of ,,.,,~, ter quality in its final environmental impact statement 
was liw_r:lcquate w1der Section 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act 
and the Guidelines established thereunder by the Council on Environmental Quality. 
The applicability of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and amendments 
t11ercto and the subj cct of water quality standards applicable tl1ereunder is dis-
cussed separately herein in Section V, infra. The following discussion pertains 
only to the adequacy, vel non, of the appellees' discussion of water quality in 
the-EIS. 
At the outset of this discussion, allow the appellant to urge that this Court 
not be drawn into the error, obviously committed by the district court, of mis-
taking quantity with quality in assessing the adequacy of appellees' discussion 
of water quality. In this regard, it is true that a considerable portion of 
Voltnne II of the final EIS was burdened 11ith considerable historical data respecting 
the past and existing quality of water of the Little Tennessee River . 
. ' 
Appellants have never questioned the past or existing quality of water in the 
Little Te1messee. In fact, appellants 1 consistent position has been that because of 
the high quality of water in this river system and attendant environmental, recre-
ational and human values, the appellees should not be pennitted to encroach upon, 
diminish or change such values without full compliance with applicable Federal 
laws. If anything, therefore, the historical water quality data presented by 
TVA in the EIS simply underscores the importance of careful and meticulous exami-
nation and prediction of environmental impacts before drastic changes in the eco-
system, including water quality, are allowed to occur. 
The district court was impressed with the quantity of water quality data 
presented by the Appellees and commented that: 
No other topic received the attention, at 
least qua11ti t::: ti Ycly, as did the 1vater 
quality aspects of the Project. 
But the d.i strict court was apparently unconcerned v.Jith ·the fact that the data 
made available by the appellccsrnocJc no attempt to analyze the probable jJnp3ct of 
[' 
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the Tellico Proj cct on \'Ja_ tcT quality. Indeed, the appell
ees' own witnesses 
seemed to contend that the-' lacked the metho
dology to do so. Appellants' witness, 
Dr. Edward Th2ckston, disagreed and osscrtcd
 that it W.:lS -v;ell within the COJTil;e-
tence and capability of the TVA to make info
rmed predictions or reservoir and 
stream behavior prior to impOtmdment and to 
analyze the impact of the impoundment 
upon water quality. 
To demonstrate the inadequacy of appellees' 
analysis of water quality, the 
appellants introduced a comprehensive study 
conducted by 1VA in 1966, of the 
probable impact of the Tellico impoundment o
n water quality, temperature and 
reservoir behavior at TVA's existing Ft. Lou
doun Reservoir: This study, which is 
part of the record belov1, demonstrates that 
TVA does, in fact, have the resources 
to predict and analyze changes in water qua
lity, water temperature and related 
matters. TVA, s witnesses v.rere at a loss to
 explain '"'hy the same sort of me·thodology 
and analysis was not emplcycd in assessing t
he impact of the Tellico impounc.Imen~. 
on water quality in other portions of the L
ittle Ten..TJ.essee River, including future 
water quality in Tellico Resen.roir. 
As the district court pointed out, the text 
of the final EIS did cm1.tain a 
brief discussion of water quality (EnviTonmental Impa
ct Statement, I-1-28-31). 
But, as a cursory examination of this discus
sion will re1.real, it ignores more than 
it illliDL-Lnates and consists, almost exclusiv
ely, of self-serving and tmsupported 
assertions that the Tellico Project will not adversely af
fect ·water quality in 
the Little Tennessee River. 
By way of contrast, appellants' water quali
ty expert, Dr. Edward Thackston, 
very specifically described at least ten are
as in \<Thich the fino~ EIS Has inade-
quate, for the purposes and under the standa
rds applicable under NEPA, in the dis-
cussion of \'-later quali ·ty. Briefly, and with
out the aid of the transcript of 
record of Dr. TI1ackston' s tc)stjJnc.my, the follmving major 
inodequacies are present 
in TVA's discussion of water qua1ity in the f
inal EIS, any one of Hhich should have 
been sufficient to justify the issu,::mce of the injunctive
 relief sought by the 
- .. - ------------ -·----------_-_-, ~:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::--------- t=-:=-:-:-:-:-::----- -- -.-.·--.·---- ------.-------:~ 1-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:_:::-::::·-:-:-::. 
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appellants: 
1. Failure to discuss, analyze or predict future. temperature str;:ttification 
in Tellico Reservoir and 'rhc effects of such stratification upon the ecosystem 
of the Reservoir and the Little Tennessee River. 
2. Failure to discuss, analyze and predict fue paths of flow of water 
through Tellico Reservoir during various seasons of the year and the effects of 
such paths of flow on the ecosystem of the Reservoir and the Little Tennessee 
River. 
3. Failure to discuss, analyze and predict the oxygen content or level of 
dissolved oxygen in Tellico Reservoir and the effect of such oxygen content upon 
the ecosystem of the Reservoir and the Little Tennessee River. 
4. Failure to discuss, analyze and predict both the temperature and oxygen 
content of reservoir outflows and the effects of changes in temperature and 
oxygen content on the ecosystem of the river below Tellico Reservoir and in the 
reservoir itself. 
5. Failure to analyze, discuss and predict the stability o' stratifications 
of water impounded in Tellico Reservoir and the possibility of widespread change 
in such stratifications with changes 1n seasm , atmospheric or weather conditions. 
6. Failure to analyze, discuss or predict the nature, quality and quantity 
of materials, including chemical constituents, which will be dissolved in the 
Tellico Resenroir in the bottom strata thereof, and the possible affect of the 
disturbance of such materials of the ecosystem of the Reservoir and the Little 
Tennessee River. 
7. Failure to analyze, discuss ar1d predict the effect, the quality and 
quanti t;: of waste discharge or nmoff f:rom .shoreline development at Tellico Reservoir. 
In this regard, the EIS clearly contemplates that shoreline development (industrial, 
conuncrcial and residential) wi11 occur at Tellico Reservoir. Indeed, the CC' 
benefit analysis of the project presupposes and is based U})On such develop; 
Witnesses for TVA conceded that the c ffec t of such development and rclaLc< C 
~:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-=-~~= 
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ru1d discharges will hJ.vc an enviromnental j n!pact, but contend (1) that such de-
Vt!lopment will not and. cannot take pbce without compliance with Federal and State 
water pollution control lo.ws and without necessary pennits from State and FederJl 
agencies, and (2) that when such development is to take place, TVA 1vill issue a 
separate environmental impact statement if "major Federal actiorl' is involved in 
authorizing, sanctioning, penni tting or funding such development. This position 
is patently untenable in light of the fact that shoreline de-.. lopment is an inte-
gral component of the overall project proposed by TVA. 
8. Failure to dete1~ne 1vhether water treatment, sufficient to meet Federal 
81ld State water quality standards, might be economically feasible. In this re-
gard, appellees take the position that no shoreline development can occur unless 
adequate treo.tment is provided under either State of Federal laws or ret,JUlations. 
While this argument may be sound, it ignores the fact that unless suc!1 shoreline 
development does occur, the Tellico Project is not economically sound and justified 
and would have a negative benefit-cost Tatio which ·will not confonn to Federal 
standards for the development of major wo_ter resource projects. It was, there-
fore, critically important that the econolll.ic feasibility of water treatment be 
analyzed and discussed in the final EIS before TVA was allowed to proceed with or 
resume construction. 
9. Failure to eS:imate the amount of treatment necessary to maintain or 
enhance water qu:::lity once the impoundment occurs and shoreline development takes 
place. This point is, of course, closely related to the prediction of the costs 
81ld economic feasibility of water treatTnent as described in subparagraph 8 above. 
10. Failure to detennine whether water quality standards for the Little 
Tennessee River and the treatment costs necessary to maintain such water quJ.lity 
would be so high as to discourage industries from locating on the Tellico Reser-
voir as opposed to alteTnative locations. Again, if the economics of providing 
treatment facilities cliscour:::tgcs or prevents the shoreline development contem-
plated by TVA in the EIS and the cost-benefit analysis, the entire project m~1y 
-.·--.--.--.--.-.--:-:.,_ .... 
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be infL sible under applicable Federal water resource project standards. 
Dr. Thackston testified~ not only that TVA had failed to analyze and dis-
cuss each of these matter:;, but also that each of thes8 matters was "signifiGmt" 
within the meaning of Section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA. 
Witnesses for the appellees readily admitted thD-t the rnD.tters enumerated by 
frr. Thackston had not been considered or treated in the EIS, bl1t contended that 
the EIS was, nevertheless, sufficient under NEPA and the CEQ Guidelines promul-
gated thereunder. 
The district court apparently adopted the position of the appellees with no 
more probing analysis that we were provided by the appellees. In this regard, the 
district court disposed of these weighty considerations with the following cryptic 
statement: 
We do not find the failure to predict the areas 
outlined by Dr. Thackston fatal to the analysis 
of the topic. Some of the points raised by Dr. 
Thackston 1vere discussed although the methodolo-
gy used to reach the conclusions was absent. Mr. 
Omrchill (for the Appellees) testified that m;:my 
of the areas were difficult to accurately pre-
dict, and the preparation would be time-consuming. 
TI1e discussion of 1vater quality is sufficient for 
the purpose of an impact statement, and, although 
the inclusion of more detailed studies would be 
of some benefit to a select group of readers, they 
\'Jere not necessary to satisfy l\lEPA. (Memorandum 
Opinion at p. 12). 
The appellant submits that the district court's cursory treatment of this 
important dimension of the environmental jmpact of the proposed project is untenable. 
We might observe that adequate and sufficient enviromnental impact statements are 
inevitably "time-consuming" and difficult to prepare; tho_t the ultimate impact of 
the proposed project and the highly technical nature of the methodology render 
accurate predictions almost inevitably "difficult to accurately predict". We mjght 
also observe that hnal environmental impact statements are inevitably prepared 
for the beilefit of rr "select group of readers", noJ11ely those scientists, attorneys) 
citizens and administr;Jtive decision-makers Hho, by choice, or as a matter of pro-
'- . "---- .. - - - -~-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:~:-:-:-:-:-:--: - -- ·-:-:-:~ ---- -- :-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:, 
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fessional assignrlicnt and oblig2;tion, find tht:msel ves concerned with the i1nplerncn-
tation of Congressional policy and the protection and enJl8ncement of irretrievable 
public resources from destruction. The district court's nniJnaginati ve and SUJ11lnary 
treatment of these important matters can hardly be considered consonant with the 
requirement in section 102 that Federal agencies be required to consider these 
matters "to the fullest extent possible." 
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMI-
NATION 11-IA.T TVA HW CmfPLIED WITH SECTIO~ 
102 (2) (D) OF ?\tPA REQUIRD;G TilE DEVELOP-
MENr OF AL TER'\:\TIV1~S TO 11-i.E PROJECT AND A 
FULL EVALUATIO~ OF 11-IEIR E>JVIRON>JEN"TAL 
IMPACTS. 
Section 102(2)(D) of NEPA requires that "to the fullest extent possible" 
agencies shall: 
... study, develop, and describe appropriate 
alternatives· to recommended courses of action 
in any proposal which involves Lmresolved conflicts 
concerning alten1ative uses of available resources. 
Section 102(2)(D) complements that provision of section 102(2)(C) requiring 
the development of "alternatives to the proposed action" within the EIS. TI1e 
failure of 1VA to comply 1vi th this requirement of 1\lEPA represents perhaps the 
clearest instance of reversible error by the district court. 
The Congressional mandate is clear and nnequivocal. The April, 1971, Guidelines 
of the Cow1eil on Environmental Quality provide that (36 Fed. Reg. 7725, para. 6 (a) 
(iv): 
A rigorous e:xploration and objective evaluation 
of alternative actions that might avoid some or 
all of t11e adverse environmental effects is es-
sential. Sufficient analysis of such al ten1a-
tives and their costs and impact on the environ-
ment should accomp~my the proposed action through 
the agency 1·evic\'! process in on1er not to fore-
close p rcm~1 ture l y c>ptions h'hich might have less 
detrimental c {lee ts. 
The present Guidelines of CEQ pnwicle similarly that an EIS sh~i.ll include 
:---:-:-:-:..:. t-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-. ~=---:-_ --- - -- -:-:-:-:-::--:-:-:-:-:- c:-:::::::-:--:-:-:-:-::--:-:-: ----·-·.-.-.--.··--.---:-.-.• 
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(38 Fed. Reg. 20554, 1\ugust 1, 1973): 
4. Al tenlativcs to the proposed action, in-
eluding, \•/here re lc\"D.nt, those not within the 
existing authority of the responsible agency. 
(Section 102(2)(D) of tbe Act requires there-
sponsible agency to "study, develop, and des-
cribe appropriate alternatives to recommended 
courses of action in any proposal which in-
volves unn:sol ved conflicts conceTning alter-
native uses of available resources".) A ri-
gorous ex-ploration and objective evaluation 
of the environmental imr;>acts of all reasonable 
alternative actions, particulaTly those that 
might affect environmental quality or avoid 
some or all of the adverse enviTonmental be-
nefits, costs and risks should accompany the 
proposed action through the agency review pro-
cess in order not to foreclose premat1.:rely 
options which might enh3Ilce environmental 
quality or have less detrimental effects. 
Examples of such alternatives include: the 
alternative of taking no action or of post-
poning action pending further study; alter-
natives requiring actions of a significantly 
different nature h'hich would provide similar 
benefits "~.'lith different environmental impo.cts 
(~&_:.__, nonstructural alternatives to flood 
control programs, or mass transit alternatives 
to highway construction); alternatives related 
to diffen~n t desig-ns or details of the proposed 
action \\'hich Hould present different environ-
mental :iJr1pacts (e.g., cooling ponds vs. cooling 
tow·ers for a pm:er plant or alternatives that 
will signific:mtly conserve energy); alterna-
tive measures to provide for compensation of 
fish and v:ildlife losses, including the acquisi-
~cion of land, 1vaters, and interests therein. In 
each case, the analysis should be sufficiently detailed 
to reveal the agency's comparative evaluation of 
the envirorm1ental benefits, costs and rislcs of the 
pToposed action and each recsonable al ten1ati ve. 
The courts have unanimously enforced this provision of NEPA. In Environmental 
Defense Fund v. F-roehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 349, the Eighth Circ11it stated that: 
In this case, a number of alternatives to the proposed 
project have been suggested by responsible critics, 
including State ancl Federal agencies ancl private groups 
and individuals. These alternatives include (1) acqui-
sition of public lands to mitigate the loss of public 
access to forest ond 1.viJ dJ ife resources, (2) flood 
plain zoning, -(3) crop insurance, (4) outright purchase 
of the fcc title to or a flO\vage casement over the 
lands in the flood plain, ancl (5) four plons cory.isting 
of various combirwtions of (li versions, floodways, n:ser-
~=-~-: ' - - . ~ . - - . ~ . -.-... -..•.... · ..... -: .·.·.·-·.·.·.-.·.·-·-·.:-::-::::: ···-· :=::-:-:-. 
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voirs, intcTcc;)tor clitc:hcs and levees. 
\\1lile some of t}~csc a1 tcn1:ltivcs \·:ere men-
tioned in the imp~1ct sto.tcrr:cnt and others set 
forth by incluclir1g lc:ttc:rs received by those 
who harl sur;gested them, none v,·ere discw:;sed 
in d.c;tail by the Corps. This treatment of 
al tcrnati vcs 1s ins1J£ficicnt. (Footnote omitted). 
See also, Kalur v . .Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971); Conm1ittee for Nuclear 
Responsibility v. Seaborr_;, F. 2d 
----- -----
3 ERC 1126, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165 (D.D.C. 1971). As 
stated by Judge Bue in Sien·a Club v. Froehlke, ~ra, at 5 ERC 1069: 
the discussion and consideration (of alterna-
tives)cannot be superficial, but must be 
thoroughly explored. (Citations omitted). 
It is not necessa1y that a particular alter-
native offer a complete solution to all 
teclmical, economic and environmental con-
siderations. If a portion of the original 
purpose of the project, or its reasonably 
logical subcomponent, may be accomplished 
by other meaJ1S, then a significant portion 
of the environmental hann attendant to the 
project as originally conceived may be alle-
viated. TI1e fact that son'ce reasonably related 
alternative might Tequire Congressional legis-
lation is not sufficient either to place it 
beyond the consideration of the agency or beyond 
inclusion in the impact statement. Likewise, 
the fact that a particular alternative would 
require substantial coordination with another 
federal agency is not sufficient, in and of 
itself, to pl:Jce its consideration beyond the 
requirements of 1\tPA. 
TI1e courts have also held, without exception, that a complete 3J1alysis of 
alternatives requires a consideration of the environmental impacts of the alterna-
\ 
tives to the project. In Natural Resources Defense Cotmcil v. Morton, 458 F.2d 
827, 834, (D. C. Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeals held that: 
Need to discuss environmental conscqu;;nces of 
alternatives 
We reject the implication of one of the Govern-
ment's submissions which began by stating that 
VJhile the Act requires a detoiled statement of 
al tcrnativcs, . it ",Jues not requiTe a Jiscussion 
of the environmc'nLll consequences of the sug-
gested alternatLve''. A sound construction of 
---- -,-,-----.-------:-:-:-:->:-: 
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NB'A, \diich takes into 2ccmmt both the legis--
lative h·istory and contcJ~·:porc:mcous executive 
con2:.tn1ction (sec notes 10 and 12), requiTes a 
prcsentaticn of the cnvinmmcntal risks inci-
dent to reasonable alternative courses of 
action. (Emphasis the Cmn-t' s.) (Sec also 
Fnviromncntal De fcnse Fund v. Frochl1~e, sLmra, 473 F. zcr~-3:c;cr.-r·--··------ ------- -~-
The EIS prepared for the Tellico PToject utterly fails to meet the judicial 
criteria established foT the development; analysis and consideration of alternatives 
to the Tellico Project. The entire discussion of alternatives to this $69 million 
project constmtcs only three and one-half pages of the final EIS for the project. 
The first three paragraphs (pp. I-1-43,44) consist of ex~colling the virtues of TVA, 
while the remainder of the discussion is limited to hypothetical projects which 
would duplicate the 'f[)enefits" of the Tellico Project. By intentionally foreclosing 
any alternative which did not offer the precise benefits of the Tellico Project, 
TVA has guaranteed that no alternative is acceptable. 'D1is superficial and circular 
reasoning process hardly meets the _manda~e of NEFA for objectivity and thoroughness 
in the consideration of alternatives. See, CEO~u~dc:'i-ne~_, sup_2:·r:L 
In addition, the EIS itself reflects that the environmental impacts of the 
few alternatives v.;hich were discussed have not been considered in the slightest. 
This failure is specifically contrary to the holding in Natural Resources Defense 
Cmmcil v. Morton, ~· 
The consideration given by the distTict court to the requirements of section 
11/ 
102 (2) (D) is no less superficial than that of the EIS itself-.- It is specifically 
contradictory to the requirements set forth by this Court in its initial ruling, 
1vherein the Court stated that the duties of agencies tmder section 102 encompassed: 
_not only constont reevaluations of projects already 
beg1m to determine \\'hether alterations can be made 
in existing feature::: or whether there are alterna-
tives to 1JTocecc1ing with the rnoj ec.ts as originally 
planned, but also the consideration of the environ-
menta]. :impact of a11 propo:::ed agency action. ( 468 
F. 2d at 1176) ~ (EIT1)has-is-o:.·ig-inal.) 
The:; court bc1ow simply bilcd tu impose the rigorous startcbrds of section -~) 
11/ TI1c court's discussion appc<lr:> at pp. 16-19 of the 1'-k~nlOl':mdtm~ Opinion. 
:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::--:-:-:-: ---·--· :-:-:-:-:-:.; 1-:-:-:-:::-:-:-:-:-:-:::::::-:::_ ··-----------------··-:-_-_ .. _._·.·--.·---·--·----:->:->: 
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(D) of NEPA hhich h<1ve been imposed tmiformly by other courts. for ex~unplc, <1t 
page 17 of the 1v1cmorandum Opinion, the court st.ated that "the extent of comple-
tion (of the project) is a factor limiting the breadth of altemati'Jes." As 
authority for this novel theory, the court at page 7 cites the initial opinion of 
. 
this Court, at 468 F.2d 1179. The Court apparently has reference to the quotation 
F. Sw_.Jp. 728, 746) which appears on that page, and 1vhich states that: 
'I11e Court_ is not suggesting that the status of 
the work should not be considered o~y the 
agency) in determining whether to proceed with 
a project. 
However, the court apparently did not read the entire statement, for the very 
next sentence states that: 
It is suggesting that the degree of the completion 
of the work should not inhibit the obi ecti Y-~· and 
thorough evaluation of the crrd Tonmental ii~::;oct of 
the pro1·r-rt "'c; l'C.'Jlll·~·;c;ci o·,r \-~"·\ \<+-hou<•J-, tl1c• ~-'-tl·-. .._.'-' o.~ '-'- .~..'- ~ 1___:~· 1'-iL-l..c 0 J! ~ a.L 
tude of the defendant~ is w1derstandable, nevertheless, 
as the Court interprets );EPA, the Con_>!ress of the United 
States iu intent u:cc;~"0 regt~irill_g~~r:Ilcic_:_~f t_b~ 
United States goven1:..ent, such as the deiendant.s here, 
to obiecti\'elv"'evalua1~e allot their DTOlects, reQard-
less ofhc~h' m\x~h-n1onev h~ts alresciv been spent thereon 
and reg-aTcHess oftl1C"Cfcgr-ee oftl1eCOrilDietion of Kork. TEmphCJ~s added.) ' 
Again, at page 19 of the Memorm1du1T1 Opinion, the court stated that, "(d) is--
cussion of the impacts of the altcn1atives although not definitive is sufficient 
to satisfy NEPA." Such a conclusion hardly comports with the requirements of .1\TEPA 
as embodied in the CEQ Guidelines that the analysis be "rigorous" and "objective". 
The most glaring error of the district court comes in its cursory dismissal of 
the requirement for consideration of non-structural altematives to the Tellico 
Project. At page 19 of the Memorandum Opinion the court states: 
The absence of discussion (in the EIS) of non-
structural al ternati l'e~; to the proj cct such as 
flood plain :::oning, flood insurance, and levees 
in Chatanooga·is not fo.taJ to the analysis since 
testimony Ly 1·1.i tncsses for defendants demon .. 
strated that tltcsc alternatives could not pro-
vide complete protection. 
----- ______ , 
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On its face, this conclusion consti tut.e::; reversible error. First, as a fac-
tual matter, TVA itself has never contended that the Tellico Project itself pro-
vides complete protection for 01attanooga. In addition, as stated in Sierra Club 
v. Froehl1~e, ~' at 5 ERC 1059: 
It is not necess;:ny that a particular alten1a-
tive offer a corr;plete solution to all technical, 
economic and envirorunental considerations. 
More important, as a legal matter, this detennination is in direct conflict 
l'ri th the CEQ Guidelines and the decided case authority. As set forth hereinabove, 
the CEQ Guidelines specifically require consideration of "nonstructural alterna-
tives to flood control programs." 38 Fed. Reg. 20554, Sec. 1500.8(a) (4). The 
comments of EPA on the draft of EIS specifically requested an analysis of non-
structural alternatives in the final EIS. (EIS, p. I-3-9). TI1ey were ignored. 
In Envirorunental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, supra, 473 F.2d at 349, the Eighth 
Circuit specifically held that the failure to consider non-structural alternatives 
for flood control purposes was insufficient as a matter of law. Clearly a f3ilure 
to require detailed consideration of nonstructural alternatives co, :;titutes grounds 
for sumnary reversal. 
1. 
The Appellants' Evidence Established that 
TVA had not Rigorously and Objectively 
Evaluated All Reasonable Alternatives to 
the Project. 
The total discussion of alternatives in the EIS is miniscule. (EIS pp. I-1-43 
to I-1-47). Moreover, as stated above, it is based upon the erroneous premise that 
"(b)asic to an analysis of a particular project is an analysis of the alteiTI<1tive 
means of supplying comparable benefits." Accordingly, the EIS itself represents 
the most persuasive evidence available that it does not meet the rigorous requiTe-
ffi2nts of '!\'EPA. Since the EIS is a part of the record as E>J1ibi t 21, lve will not 
elaborate here on the inadequclCics \\'h:i ch appear on the face of the donmK~nt. The 
best that can be said of the discussion is that it requires the reader to accept 
as an article of faith the conclusions h'hid1 arc reached. It cont a5_ns no Tigorous 
__________________ 
------- --------
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analysis of reason.:1blc al tcrn::ltivcs to th(~ proj cct, and is replete with conclusory 
statements that are not supported by eithc[ probing analysis or factual data. 
In addition to the EIS itself, the appellonts presen.ted additional evidence 
regarding the availability of reasonable alten1atives to the project. 1\Iany were 
not discussed at all; few were discussed even smnnarily. 
For example, Dr. Joseph Carroll testified that the development of an indus-
trial complex at Florence, Alabama, was a reasonable alternative to the project. 
This recommendation was developed by Dr. CarToll and presented to TVA duTing his 
employment in 1964. (Ex. 37). In response to that recommendation by Dr. CarToll, 
Mr. George Tully of TVA prepared a memorandum to Mr. J. PQTter Taylor, the 01ief of the 
Navigation Branch of TVA. (Ex. 38). The memorandum is dated August 24, 1964. The 
memorandum states, in peTtinent part, that: 
The second paper (of Dr. C<<rroll), . 'A Study of 
the Possibility of Developing h'aterfTont Indus-
trial Sites at Florence, Alabama' , presents one 
alternative location for the development of 
waterfront sites. It is not a project justifi-
c; ':.ion statement. The real point which it suggests 
is this: If the development of waterfront indus-
trial sites is, in itself, a desirable or necessary 
activity, all al ten1a ti ve locations and methods 
of development should be examined in order to 
make ma.'d111um use of the expenditures rn:1de. In 
this re_gard, the Floren:=_~ sites are real alt"er-
natives to the Te ll_ico Proi eeL (Emphasis added.) 
No discussion of the Florence site:' appears in the EIS. Moreover, the conclu-
sion of Mr. Tully that those sites are "real alternatives to the Tellico Project" 
'~s tmcontTadicted at trial. 
TI1e appellants also presented evidence regarding the alten1ative of developing 
the Little Temwssee IU.\rer as a scenic ri vcr. TI1e only discussion of such an al-
tcrnative in the EIS is the following, at page I-1-46: 
TVA also considered development of the 33 miles of 
river in its present state for scenic usc in lieu 
of the Tellico Proicct ~mel the alternative ab::mdon-
ment of the project. Either altern.1.tive would re-
sult in the failure to realize benefits that will be 
provided by the Tellico Project, which in TVA's judgment are too valuable to be lost, and both alter-
natives were rejected. 
·:·" r-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:·:· ..... r::-:-:-:-:-:-~-=--:·:-:-:-:-. f:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-: 
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In marked contrast to this cursory dismissal, the appcll.:-mts introduced jnto 
evidence a comprehensive alternative plan for the Little Tennessee River, consist-
ing of a state scenic river, Tcstoration of the CheTokc2 villo.ge sites and estab-
12/ 
lishment of a state park. (Ex. __ ) .- While such a plan is bu-::: one of the many 
alternatives· to the Tellico Proj cct, it iJlustrates iJ1 a graphic fc;.shion the 
summary consideration given to simi:!.ar alternatives by TVA. 
2. 
The Appellants 1 Evidence Established that TVA Did 
Not Evaluate the Environmental Impacts of AJterna-
tives to the Tellico Project. 
As set forth hereinabove, NEPA Tequires Federal agencies to analyze in detail 
the environmental impacts of alternatives to the project. CEQ Guidelines, supra; 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, supra. In this regard, the court 
below stated that (J.fem. Op. 18): 
The impact statement in this ,case, although 
dlvelling on economic factors, also describe 
alternatives to the pToject and evaluates 
their environmental costs and benefits. 
With due respect to the district court, we are unable to locate an evaluation 
of the environmental costs ;:mel benefits of the alternatives to the project in the 
EIS. The only discussion remotely relevant to this subject appears at page I-1-46 
of the EIS under the heading, "Project Design Alternatives." In the first full 
paragraph, a general description is given of a smaller reservoir as an alternative 
to the project and the statement is made that: 
A lake this size would not affect trout fishing in 
the upper 8 miles bet>•Iecn Chilhm·:ee DJJ11 and the 
beginning of the (Tellico) lake, and it would not 
inundate most of the aTchaeological sites upstream 
from U.S. Higln·:ay 41L This lmv dam \l!ould, also, 
of course, reduce some of the other impacts described 
12/ As indicated previously, a copy is attached for the benefit of the Court. 
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in this st:1tcn~cnt. Progressively highcT dams would 
involve p:rogrcs::;ivcJy gn:otcr hnpacts on these values. 
We believe the recorc'. 1·."il1 reflect that this is the sum total of the considera-
tion given to the environmental iJnp.Jcts of the alternatilles to the Tellico Project. 
No consi:::leration is given to the impscts of alternatives such as flood plain zoning, 
flood insur<:mce, levees in Chattc:mcoga and other non- stiuctural alternatives to the 
project. Specific tesUJTiony was provided in these areas by Dr. Edward Clebsch. No 
consideration is given to the relative environmental jJ11pacts of an industr· :11 com-
plex in Florence~ Alabm~a. At best, cursory consideration is given to the impacts 
of developing a scenic river complex. No consideration is given to the impact of 
installing additional electrical generating capacity in one of TVA's planned nuclear 
facilities to compensate for the loss ofcapacity at Tellico. (EPA comments, EIS 
p. I-3-9). No consideration is given to the impacts of locating a dcu'l at another 
site, except to state that a dam on the Hiwasee !Uver "would be much less desirable 
from an environmental standpoint." (EIS p·. I-1-45). No considerati'. 1 is given 
either to the alterno.tive or its impacts of a series of two or three low dams with 
locks and a shorter navigable chm1nel as Tecommended by the East Tem1essee Develop-
ment District. (EIS p. I-3-97). 
It is a sony record. Moreover, the court belmv was fully aware of these de-
ficiencies through the testimony of Dr. Edward Clebsch, Mr. James Payne, Mr. Walter 
Criley, Dr. Joseph Can-oll, Mr. Price Wilkins and through the full availability of 
the EIS itself. In spite of that uncontradicted testimony, the court depztrted 
from the rigor01..1s mcmdatcs of N1~PA and held that "(d) iscussion of the impacts of 
the alternatives although not definitive is sufficient to satisfy NEPA." 
We disagree. If 1\TEPA does not require more: 
... it will simply become a minor nuisnnce for agencies, 
ilnposing one more oblig:1tion of papc1work before they can 
get on 1vith the proj ccts they intend to build. That 
apprwch \>'iJJ.simply pave (oT at least littcT) the road 
to envinmmcntal chaos with the full disclosures of countlc' 
impact statements. (Com:nt ttce to Stop Route 7 v. Vol~; 
346 F. Supp. 7:)1 (D. Cc!]--1r~1~fF2Jl~---- - --
,._-_-_____________________ _ l--------------- 1-:-:-:-~-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:-:-:-:-~-:-:-._-:--- .·:::-:<-:-:- :-:-:-:-:-:-:-:--: ·=-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-·-:-·- ------
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rv. 
THE DISTRICT COU!U ERRFD IN ITS DETIR\lT?\ATION THAT TVA H'\D CmiPLIED \'i ITH .s!TTfL)~~-f~f2 ( 2J]}~LOF _\EP"\_:_ 
:-:-:-:-:-:-: 
Section 102(2) (B) of J'.,13PA, 43 U.S.C. Sec.4332(2) (D),requires that each Federal 
agency 11 to the fullest extent possible'' shail: 
• . . identify and develop methods and procedures . . which will insure that presently Lmquantified en-vironmental amenities and values may be given approp-riate consideration in decisionrnaking along with economic and technical considerations. 
This duty was recognized in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engine(c::rs, 
325 F. Supp. 749, 757 (E.D. Ark. 1971), wherein the court .stated: 
It does not appear that methods and procedures have been developed ... which would permit the defend-ants to assign values to presently unquantified environmental amenities, so that such values might be· taken into consideration in decisionrnaking along with the economic and technical consideration as required by Sec. 102(2)(B). As a result, the defendants have been unable, as a practical matter, to take into consideration, in estimating costs and benefits, the "value'' of the Cossatot as a free-flowing stream. 
The dut-y was further clarified iTl Sierra Club v. Froehlke, supra, at 5 ERC 1084: 
NEPA obligates agencies of the Federal Government to 
identify and develop methods and procedures, in consul-tation 1vi th the. Council on Environmental Quality . . . which will insure that presently unquantified environ-mental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations. 
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4332 (2)(B). As we enter the third year following the passage of 1\JEPA, this has still not been done. 
The legislative history of NEPA clearly reveals that Congress intended the development of adequate methodology for evaluating the fu11 environmental impacts and the full costs - social, cconc>J;Jic, ~md en vi Tomnental - of federal actions. (Citing 115 Cong. Rec. 40420 (1969)). 
At trial the appellants presented thG testimony of Dr. Paul E. RobeTts concGrning 
------ --------- :->:-:-:-:-:-:-; -:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:- ---- :-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-- ;-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:.:-:-:-:-:->·· :-:-:-:-:-.-:-:-:-:-:-:-) 
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the development of a 1ncthoJology for evaluating the environmental costs of destroy-
ing archaeological sites~ in this inst<mce the Cherokee village site of Tenasi. 
Such an assignment of cost:= was specifically recognizec.l 2nd prescribed by the court 
in Sierra Club v. FroehJkc, supra, at 5 ERC 1073: 
Although there is no 'cost' a·signed to the loss of 
these archaeological sites for benefit cost purposes, 
there is no indication that protection of the sites 
is anticipated, even though some means are reported 
as being available. 
The testimony of Dr. Roberts did not purport to be the only method by which 
costs could be assigned to the destruction of historical values, but was presented 
to exemplify both the lack of development of such methodo~ogy by TVA, and the fact 
that a methodology is available for taking such factors into consideration. 
It is beyond dispute that TVA's regulations do not contain any such methodology 
or make provision for its development. 36 Fed. Reg. ~ 1010. 
The determination of the district court on thi~ issue in unclear. Contrary·to 
the statement of the court, the appellants did not urge that "an agency (is) required 
to compute in dollar figures every environmental loss. 11 (Mem. Op. 21). We alleged~ 
m1d established through the evidence, precisely what the court indicated: TI1at TVA 
had not developed methods and procedures for appropriate consideration of presently 
unquailtified amenities. TVA presented no evidence to the cc,ntrary, as indeed, 
they could not, since no attempt has been made to develop such pTocedures, nor are 
any such procedures reflected in the 1VA Regulations issued tmder ~"EPA. Accordingly, 
the court below erred in its determination that TVA has complied with section 102(2)(B). 
v. 
11-IE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCUIDING 
11-Lt\.T T!-IE FLDE0\L --i\.\'fER -F~5f.ID1To~f co:\JTROL 
ACT A~iE0iD\!ti\TS AI~E J\,\l'PL T C:\BLE 1\:\D T!-L.\'f 
APPELLi\NfS'CL \f:\ll1Tf:rn'JJ:\DE:Rl\A.S\V11''F!CJ'lTr 
lvffiRIT. 
In a most summary and arbitrary fashion, the United States District Court 
below dismissed all claims made by the appe1l<.lnts t.mder the Federal Water l'ollution 
Control Act and amendments thereto (3:~ U.S .C., Sections 1323, ct scg_.), c K1ing 
·----.-.-. -- . . - - -:-:-:-::-:-:-:~:-:-:-::-:-:-: 
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that such claims \<!ere v:ithout merit ~md n1ling that " .. this Act has no applica-
tion tmder the facts of this case." 
As hereinafter noted, this conclusion simply ignored extensive test:imony by 
water quality expeTts for both the appe11ant and the appellee and the very cogent 
comments of the United States Environmental Protection Agency as set forth in cor-
respondence from the Regional Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency to 
the appellees. 
But, as a threshold matter, the district court's ruling on this point was 
clearly inconsistent with its earlier 111ling delineating the issues for trial on the 
merits, that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments were properly at 
issue herein and that the appellants had properly stated a cause of action thereunder. 
At that stage of the proceedings below, the appellees had moved to dismiss the 
counts under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the district court denied 
the motion, although counts stated Lmdc:>.r other Federal laws Kere dismissed. 
Although it is impossible to decipher the District Court's rationale for dis-
missing appellants' claims U.."'1der the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments, 
the court apparently, in the final analysis, adopted the appellees' misconceived 
notion that said amencL11ents aTe not applicable because the Tellico Project will not 
result in any "discharge" of "po11utants 11 into the Little Tennessee River or other 
interstate streams. This, however, was not and is not the theory under which the 
appellm1ts frmned their counts in the complaint under the Federal IVater Pollution 
Congrol Act. In this regard, the pertinent portion of the Act, as amended, provides 
as follows: 
Each department, agency, or instrLmlC?.ntality of the 
executive, legislative, and judicial brcmches of the 
Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any 
property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity 
resul t.ing, or 1·:hich mayresul t, in the discharge or 
nmoff of pollutants shall complv with Federal, State 
interstate, <:md local requirements respecting control 
and abatement of pollution to the same extent that any 
person is subject to such requirements, including the 
payment of reasonable service charges ... (33 U.S.C., 
Sec. 137,3.) 
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TI1e statute is coudJcd in the disj uncti vc rather than the conjunctive and it 1:; clear 
that the requirements of the statute are applicable to any Federal agency which either 
has jurisdiction over Federal facilities .:.?._"!:_engages in an activity which m2ty result 
i.11 the discharge or rw1off of pollut;:mts. 
Apart f:r:om the question as to whether TVA, in construcdJlg and operating the 
Tellico Project, is engaging Ul activity Hhich may result in the discharge or nmoff 
of pollutants, it cannot be seriously questioned that TVA does have jl isdiction of 
property and facilities which are specifically subject to the Act. 
Apparently, the district court adopted the appellees' narrow and constrictive 
interpretation of the amendments which, if sustained, Kould exempt virtually every 
major Federal water impoundment project from the terms of the Act and effectively 
exempt Federal facilities from jurisdiction of the Act. Nhile this result may be 
salutory in the view of the appellee, it clearly violates the e1:-press tenns of the 
Act <md tl;e intenC.ment of Congress in adopting amcmcL11ents to alterations in watt::r 
quality caused by Federal facilities. The decision and order of the district court 
below· should be reveTsed, as a matter of law, on this basis alone. 
Apart from the district court's clear misinterpretation of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, the district court also erroneously ignored considerable and 
persuasive evidence in the record that the Tellico Project could not conform to 
applicable Federal and State water poJ.lution control standm·ds and that, as to 
water quality, the final enviTonmental :Unpact statement was totally inadequate and 
wholly i11sufficient under both the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
ail.d the National E:nviTonmen Lal Policy Act, 
The appellailts 1 assertion in this regard is apparently concur.ced in by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency. In a letter doted August 7, 1972, 
M:r. Jack Ravan, Regional Administrator, Envirorunent.:1l Protection Agency, advised 
Dr. F. E. Go.rtrell of the Tennessee VaHey Author 7 follows: 
TI1e .i tt1c Tennessee River is f'J"escntly classified 
for fish and ao~uatic life' \vith d -lcsignation as trout 
\vatcrs from the mc:1th to the /Vo rth Carolina-Tennessee 
-----.-.-.-.-.-:-:-.-.---:-: t=:=·=:=::--:-:->:- -- .·.-.·.·.-.·.·-.·-·.-.·-::-.-.::> ..... -·-·.·.·.---.-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:"; 
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State line. Tite proj cct 1s likely to cause a viol at ion of 
the associa.teu tcr,;pcr0turcs from 62°F to 87°F in a substan-
tial part of tr1c reservoir. Also; the clissolvc·u m:ygen 
level of 6.0 mg/1 idlich is required for trout strca~~ts 
will probably be violated. If the project is CL'mplr~tcd, 
either the strecm1 classification must be changed or there 
1rill, in all probability, be a violation of the Hater 
quality standarQS. 
The above-quoted letter was introduced 1n evidence at trial through l\1r. Greer 
Tidwell, a representative of the Environmental Protection Agency who testified in 
lieu of Mr. Ravan. 
In the same corTespondence, Mr. Ravan commented further that: 
•.. I would simply like to point out Section lOl(b) (4) 
of the National Environmental Policy Act.of 1969, Hhich 
clearly places the responsibility on us, the Federal Agen-
cies, to use all practical means consistent with other 
consideTations of nationo.l policy, to improve and 
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs and 
resources to the end that the Nation may preserve 
important historic, cultural and natural aspects of 
our National heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, 
an enviTonment ·Khich supports di \-·eT.si ty, vai'iety and 
individual choice. 
TI1e stream classification of the Little Tennessee RiveT has not been changed and, 
absent such change, the UI1contradicted testimony before the district court den.~mstrates 
conclusively that the Tellico Project will undoubtedly result in a violation of 
applicable water qtmli ty standards. 
Dr. Edward Thackston, who testified for Appellants on the matter of water qualit.)', 
agreed that the construction of the Te11ico Project would result in a violation of 
water quality standards in at least tivo areas; water terrrperature and dissolved O).;gen, 
and possibly others as well. The appellees did not W1c1ertake to refute this tesbJwny, 
apparently choosjJ1g to rely on the assertions that such testimony was irrelevant on 
the ground that the Ten.TJ.essee Va1lcy Authority is exempt frcn the requirements of 
the Federal WateT Pollution Control Act amendments. For the reasons set forth above, 
this position is simply erroneous and the indulgence of the distTict C' ·1rt in adopting 
appellees' position on this issue wa::c; clear error. 
1::Y Note: Ci t;Jtion to this Exhibit mnnbcr is presently un~1v::1il: 
t=-:-:-:::::::-:::-:-:::-:-:-:-:::-:-:::-:-:->:- ... -- ---·,·-·.-.... - ·- --- --- ----.----------·-------·-·-·---":' ~=-:-:::-:::-:::-:::-:-:::-::-:-::: --_ --- ._. ______________ •. -.------.---
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VI. 
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470f 
provides that: 
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect 
jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or Federally assisted 
undertaking in any State and the head of any Federal 
department of independent agency having authority to license 
any unde1·taking shall, prior to the approval of the 
expenditure of any Feden1l flmds on the lllldertaking or 
prior to the issuance of any license, dS the case may be, 
take into accollllt the effect of the lllldertaking on any 
district, site, building, stn1cture or object that is 
included in the Nationo.l Register. The head of any such 
Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Council on His-
toric Preservation established under sections 4701-470n 
of this title a reasonable oppoTtllllity to corrunent with 
regard to such tmdertaking. 
:-: ---:-~-.:-..; 
TI1e Act was signed into law on October 15, 1966, and the Tellico Project \'Vas 
approved by the TVA Doard on Nover.1ber 8, 1966. On August 30, 1973, the 01e:cokee 
village sites of Chota-Teno.si were added to the National Register of Historic 
Places. (Ex. 29). Tims, there is no question that the Act is applicable to the 
Tellico Project since the project, quite obviously, will affect a site included on 
the National Register. 
Pursuant to the Act, the President issued Executive Order No. 11593, 36 Feel. Reg. 
8921 0-971) confirming and delineating the duties of Federal agencies llllder the Act. 
Section 2 (a) of the Executive Order requi1'es all FederRl agencies, including the 
defendants, "no later than July 1, 1973" to "locate, inventory and nominate to the 
·Secretary of the Interior all sites , .. under their jurisdiction of control that 
appear to qualify for listing on the National Resigtcr of Historic Plo.ccs." Section 
2 (b) requires the agency to "exe:ccise c0.ution" over any site which might qualify foT 
listing on the Nation3l Register ::mel to "reconsider" the proposed agency action 1n 
light of a dete1111ination by the Sco·ctary of the Intcl'ior that a site is likeJy t,-, 
-:-:->:-:-:-:-:-:-. :===~=-:-:-:-:-:-:-:---: --_-.--.. -----. ·-=-~-: : ::_ =:=:=:=:=: :-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: 
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q'.lalify for listing on th8 Register. 
In early September, 1973, Mr. KerulCth Tapman, the Compliance Offic8 for the 
National Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, stated in response to a letter 
from TVA that TVA was not ln compliance with the requirements o£ the National His-
toric Preserv-ation Act and Executive Order 11593 with respect to the village site 
of Chota-:Tenasi (Ex. 34) .. TI1is conclusion was confirmed by the testimony of Mr. 
Mack Prichard and \vas uncontradicted at trial. 
The basis for non-compliance was the failure of TVA to reconsider the Tellico 
Project in light of the inclusion of Th8 Chota-Tenasi site on the National Register 
at the time of trial. Tile district court held that TVA had not complied \vith the Act) 
stating (Mem. Op. 26): 
As to the Indian villag8s nominated on August 30, 1973, 
for inclusion in the National Register, TVA has not yet 
had the. opportunity to comply with the Act but stated at 
~ •:ial it fully intended to do so. 
We submit that the mere assurC1f1ce o£ Federal agencies that they "in~end" to 
comply with the mandates of Congress is not enough. The Federal repoTts are replete 
vli th cases in which an agency intended to comply vli th NEPA, and made efforts to do 
so, but in the eyes of the judiciary, fell far short. 
Tile mm1dates of the National Historic Preservation Act are no less rlgorous than 
NEPA. TI1e fourth Circuit, in Ely v. Velde, 451 f.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971), held ·that 
failure to comply with the Act warranted the issuance of injunctive relief. The 
situation is no different here. If the courts aTe merely to accept the assurances 
of agencies that they "intend" to comply with the Acts of CongTess, then the Constitu-
tional role of the judiciary becomes meaningless. As stated by the District of 
Cohnnbia Circuit in Calvert Cliffs, supra, 449 F.2d at 111: 
Several recently enacted statutes attest to the commit-
ment of the Government to control, at long last, the 
destructive engine of material 'progress'. But it 
remains to be seen whether the promise of this legis-
lation will become a re;11ity. Therein lies the judi-
cial role . . . Our duty, in short, is to see that 
important legislc1ti ve purposes, heralded in the halls 
of Congress, are not lost or JlLisdirectccl in the vast 
hallways of the federal bureaucLlcy. 
them 
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VII. 
TI-IE DISTIUCT COURT ERRt:D DJ Drs;.!JSSD;G THE APPEL-
lANTS I CLAJ\j:') lJ\DtJ\ i'H[~\T\1Tf70f~\ITT_G\'fT6'flrE -
TINITFlfSTA'fE~o:KslTFVL'l o~. 
Appellants have claimed that the construction of the Tellico Project would deny 
'The right to enjoy the beauty of God's creation, to live 
in an environment that preserves the nnquontified amenities 
of life, and to pr::::serve the history of this nu.tion and the 
heritage of one of the great American Indian tribes (which) 
is part of tl1c liberty protected by the fifth Amendrnent 
from deprivation without due process of law) and is also 
one of those t.menumerated rights retained by the people, 
free from abridgement by any government, as provided in 
the ninth Amendment." (Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. ). 
The failure of the court belmv to recognize and protect this right was reversible 
error. 
The Ninth Amendment has been given two divergent constructions. The nan·ow 
construction of the amendment is fonnded upon the intent.of the author, Madison. 
Legal scholars have aTgued that many federalists were opposed to the Bill of Rights, 
and favored no mention of particular rights on the gronnd that all rights existed 
unless taken away by the State. When proponents of the Bill of Rights were foLmd 
to be in the majority, it is.contended, the ninth and tenth amendments were added 
to the Bill of Rights, not in recognition of further rights, but as a gesture of 
14/ 
compromise to a losing faction.-
Mrile intriguing, this view seems illogical. It must fiTst be noted that the 
intent of the CongTess rather than of the author of the amendment would be moYe 
dispositive of the controversy over its meaning. Unfortunately, the history of the 
passage of the amendment is not illuminating, and little material is available 
15/ 
on the individual interpretations held by each delegate.- History, then, is 
insufficient to clarify the Ninth Amendment. Yet, historical analysis is the basis 
of its narrow construction. 
14/ 
In contrast, the more broad v:~ew of the Amendment, that it 1s a recognition 
See: Garvey, Unemnncratecl Rights ·· Sub:;tanti vc Due Process, the Ninth ;\mcncL,_•nt, 
and John Stuart ~!ill - 1971 WL.c. L. l\cv. 922 (1~171) 
Ibid. 
~:-:-:-:-. 
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of subst::mtivc righL, 1s amply supported Jn the decisional law~ 1n scholarly works; 
and in reason. 
The Sup:c-eme Court ha..<~ recognized the ninth Amendment as a r-eservation to the 
16/ 
people of suostantivc rights.- J?erhaps the most notable decision of the Court 
is Gr-iSi.Y'Jld v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 469 (1965). Mr. Justice Douglas' majority 
opinion in that case states t1Ktt"(t)he Ninth Amendment provides 11 and then 
includes the text of the amendment as partial justification for the opinion that 
marital privacy is constitutionally protected. Mr. Justice Goldberg (concurring) 
not only accepts the broad view of the ninth Amendment by implication, but goes on 
to state explici tely that the message of the ninth Amendment_: is that "there are 
17/ 
other 'fundan1ental personal rights 1 ' 1 • 
Such judicial recognition is upheld ·by scholarly analysis. Kelsey, in his 
18/ 
article "The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution"- concludes that the 
amendment declares abs.Jlute or inherent Tights against ·which any assertion of power 
19/ 
must fail. 
Kelsey'.s view, that the Amen.'ment precludes ,"govenuncntal authority (from 
20/ 
aspiring) to ungranted power in contravention of unemm1erated rights,- is shared 
21/ by Redlich in his "Are TI1ere 'Certain Rights . . Retained by the People'?"-.-
M:r. Redlich finds suppoTt for the broad view of the Ninth Amendment in the l:.mguage 
of the Tenth .Amendment that: 
''The powers not delegnted to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. (Eri1phasis added. ) 
16/ United Public WoTks v. Mitche11, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947). 
17/ 381 U.S. at 482. 
18/ 11 Ind. L. J. 309 (1936) 
19/ Ibid. at 323. 
20/ Ibid. 
21/ 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 787 (1962). 
-. 
_-,_-_-_-_-._-________ .___ ::::-:-: ~=-:-:-:-. 
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1l1e fact that there are uncJkJmerated powers which neither the federal govenr:;e:nt 
22/ 
nor the State possess irnplies that there: arc unenumcratcd rights in the people. 
To disagree ·with these judicial and schoL1 ly opinions would be: illogical. Such 
a view would disregard the rule of statutory interpretation that no statute be so 
. 
23/ 
read as to dcrrive any of its words of meaning. -The amendment states that there 
are "certain (unenumerated) rights . . . retained by the people''. To fail to recog-
nize and protect these rights is to deny the meaning of that clause of the amendraent, 
although the teaching of J'.1arbun7 v. Madison is that no clause of the Constitution 
-z-q--
can be presumed to be without effect.-
The COo1clusion that the Ninth l\Jnendment reserves cert.ain substantive rights to 
the people is not only reasonable, but necessary. Modem technology is presently 
imposing itself on individual needs and interests in a rncmJ1er which would have 
confounded the creators of the Constitution. The destruction of our heritage and 
our natural environJnent are but two of the many threats of "progress". CouYts £ail 
to protect individuals adequately when their inquiry into the uses of power arc 
"limited to deteTminio"'1g lv·hether such uses are justified. There must also be an inquir;," 
into what interests are being violated and whether those interests are constitution-
ally protected. The Ninth Amendment provided the basis for such inquiry and the 
shield behj nd ',vhich such rights may be preserved. Gm-vey, _supra, n. 1. 
The conclusion that the Ninth Amendment is a resenration of tmenumerated S1Jbstan-
tive rights leads to an inquiry to detennine the standard by which such rights rnisht 
be identified. In Gris~;·old, }.h·. Justice Goldberg described them as "other ft_md.J.J.:ental 
rights". 381 U.S. at 482. Be went on to note that: 
In determining \vhat rights are ftmda.rnental, judges aTe not 
left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and 
private notions. Rather, they must look to the 'traditions 
and collective conscience of our people 1 to determine \1'hcther 
a principle is 'so rooted (there) ... as to be racked as 
f1.mdamcntal'. Snyder v. 0Llss~lchussctts, 291 U.S. 97, 105. (318 U.S. at 483f____ ---·-------
22/ Ibid. at 807. 
23/ Sec: C::nvey_, n. L 
!_~ 1 Cranch 137, 174. 
t=-:-:-:-:-:-:--::--:-:·:·:-:-:-:-:-: ~---.. --. - - - . -
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lv1lile the concepts of "the enviromncnt 11 .:md 11 the American heritcgc" may not have 
been rooted j n the conscience of our people since our nation's jJ1ccption, they m·e 
the !_2.]1es_ of concerr1s that were intended to be protected. 
It is man's spiritual natt:cT2 which is dam::1ged by the loss of natural"1 beauty and 
cu1 tural heritage. In a ve11 real sense the Tellico proj cct deprives appellants 
of "as against the government, the right to be left alone - the most comprehensive 
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men''. Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). Accordingly, the couTt below erred in dismissing appel-
lants' Constitutional claims. 
VIII. 
TIIE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO Ah'ARD 
REASONABLE AHOR\E'r' FEES A\D COST-s:-----
On Nover.lber 1, 1973, appellants appeared before the district court at a sepa-
rate hearing on the question of the allocc1tion of cc.sts between the parties. At that 
time, and prior to the entry of Judgment: appellants moved the district court for an 
award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. That portion of the motion pertaining 
to attomeys fees ivas summarily denied; costs ·were awarded to appellants through the 
hearing on the prel:iJninary injtmction and to appellees for costs incurred thereafter 
and through the trial on the merits. 
No specific reasons were articulated by the court below for denying appellant.s' 
motion for a ttonwys fees although reference was made by the court to the fact tho. t} 
in the court's judgment, this case was not "an appropriate one" for the awarding of 
attorneys fees. Costs were apportioned on the theory that up to and through the 
p:reliminary injtmction proceedings, appell<mts were the "prevailing party" and at the 
trial on the merits appellees were the "prevo.iling partytt. Appellants submit that 
the court below was :iJ1 error on both the refusal to award attorneys fees and on i t.s 
apportionment of costs. 
We begin with the observation by UK:n Judge Burger J that public interest grc,ups: 
... (A)rc genera1Jy mnon:;: the best vindicators of the 
' '' .. -:-:-:·:-:-:---3 
- 64 -
public jntcTest . . . T11cse :~roups are found in 
every cn;'~Lmi ty; they usu:1lly concern themselves 
with a Hide range of commw1i ty problems and tend 
to be Tcprescntatives of broad as distinguished 
from IDrrow interests, public as disti:-lg,Jished 
from private or corrmercial interests. !!i) 
While ~mericm1 courts have traditionally been reluctant to award atton1cys 
fees to a party litigant, a growing number of Federal courts have made such awards 
to public interest litigants serving the role of "private attorney general 11 • In the 
present cause, appellant Environmental Defense Fund is serving in that role. On this 
basis it is submitted that the court below erred in refusing to award attorney fees 
and all costs) thus imposing an economic sanction on the appellant organization, 
a charitable organization funded entirely by charitable cbntributions, that has 
sought nothing more than compliance with the Federal statutes and policies violated 
by appellees. 
In a variety of contexts, Congress has left enforcement of important reform 
legislation to a public spirited private ~;tizens and goal oriented organizations. 
Yet the puTsuit of public rights in litigation of the present type is often cost-
pTohibitive and few citizens or groups have the economic TesouTces to prosecute 
public interest litigation since the pri.Jn:JT)' relief sought is almost always declaratory 
and/or injtmctive and not economic. 
The economic pToblerns confronting public interest group litigation first arose 
in the civil rights area. The Supreme Court, in a "citizen suit" controversy under 
Federal civil rights legislation, has stated: 
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident 
that enforcement would prove difficult and that the nation 
,,muld have to rely in p;ut upon private litigation as a means 
of securing broad compliance Hith the law. A Title II suit is 
thus pri Wl tc in form only. When a plaintiff brings an action 
under that Title, he cmmot recover damages. If he obtains 
an iniunction, he docs so not for hi1nsclf alone but also as 
a ~_j:-\;i~cc -ntt<_Jmc:)~lT~-:__~c~al, vindic(l_ti~~!_ a }2_o_licy that Con-
gress con~l_:lcrcJ _?f_J_J~ h i-'0,h::.:._st ~~_0::_E.i!Y. If successful 
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plaintiffs ,,;ere routjnclv forced to bc::n their u.m 
attorn:~vs 1 ec~~ .. r~c\·l 3"'Ti-cn;zr oartTcs 1·:oufCflK' li\--
aJ?()S:rt'] OJ1-1:o-::;-a \'cm-c e .. the j~ti}>_(l_S::_ fn~0J c sT h:~_xl~'.~)-ki _r:t_g_ 
the injuncti\e pm;cr of the fcJcra] COllrts. ;\c'.,:lUli V. 
~ig~, Park En~erpris~, .:;yo u.s. 4oo--;-4~4ozu-:-96-8). 
Emphasis suppllcd). 
The mvarding of attorney fees to a successful public interest litigant, then, 
is a desirable and at tin1es indispensible adjunct to the Congressional granting of 
a private right of action. In certain instances, Congress ha..s provided for such 
an award in the statute itself. ~Park, supra. In other instances, Federal 
courts, in effectuating Congressional policy, have in~lied through statuto1; con-
struction an "attorneys fees" provision for public interest suits under the statute 
in question. See 1'-tills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
In Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir., 1971), the Court 
dealt with the scope of the private remedy tmder 42 U.S. C. Sec. 1982, a statute 
guaranteeing freedom from discriminatory treatment in the· enjoyment of property 
rights. The statute is silent on the question of attorneys fees,but th~ Court 
nevertheless follild statutory authority to award attorneys fees: 
We think the factors relied on in Piggy Park in inter-
pTeting the provision for awarding aftorneys fees apply 
also to suits tmder Section 1982. The policy against 
discrimin_ation in the sale or rental of property is 
equally strong. The statute, under present judicial 
development, depends on private enforcement ... To 
insure that individual litigants are Hilling to act 
asprivate attorney generals to effectuate the public 
purposes of the statute, attorneys fees shculd be as 
available as under 42 U.S.C. Section 3612(c). Ibid. 
at 147, 148. 
Because of the analogous nature of enviTonmental litigation to civil rights 
litigation, in that both involve the pursuit of "public rights", Federal courts 
have been receptive to awarding attorneys fees in litigation similar to the instant 
cause. 
In Si_crrCJ Club v. 12_'1m , F. Supp. 
---
, S ERC 1745 (W.D. Tey~as~ 1973) ~ 
---
the district court awarded attorneys.' fees to the plainbff Sierra Ciub dcspi tc: the 
fact that plaintiff had not prevailed in the litigation. TI1e Court stated: 
~ ~. ~.--- -.-. -.--·--.-.-. ·.·.·.· ::::.: ::::·:-::- :-:-:-:-:-:~ 1-:-:-:-:-:_-:-:-:-::=:::::::-:_-:: ---- ----->:-::~ ::-:-:-:-. . - -:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:~:-:-:-:-:-::--; 
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After rcvicHing the f:1cts here this Court is of the 
be~ ief that the r;o:; i tion of the ci ti :>.en D] aint j H is an2_l~~us to---:;cllit-()j- a ]JL.Jint_.~_f_L_in a civil ridlti 
suit, hhcrein it h:1::; been concluded tiw.t attornc\·s' 
fees should be a\orded tmlcss the triai (:ourt Gm 
articulu~-c _2})cci(Lc 1·c:1sons fm· denial ... As in 
the ci v:ll rigT)i~.s area ~tE-e burden~ Clssuring full 
complia.nce with the national environmental policy 
act has fallen upon cuncerned citizens. TI1e mere 
fact that there is no provision in the statute 
for the awarding of attorneys' fees ',vill not be 
viewed as a ban to such a11 award. Ibid. at 1746. 
$mphasis supplied.) 
-:...·----.------------
------
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
F.2d , 5 ERC 1891 (1st Cir., 1973), plaintiffs were successful in obtaining 
---
----· ···-·-' -~-· .. · .. _.-.... -. ----' 
judicial relief requiring EPA to comply ·with certain of i"t;s obligations lmder the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. Finding a statutory waiver of EPA's immity 
protection under 28 U.S.C. Section 2412, the Court awarded both costs and atto1ueys' 
fees to the plaintiffs. In doing so, the Court first noted the growing trend toward 
an equitable distribution of litigation costs as a J;J~ans of encouraging litigation 
in the p1.1blic interest. Ibid. at 1891-1892. Turning to the import<mt policies and 
goals embodied in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, the Court stated: 
'lhe public suit seems paTticularly instrumental to the 
statutory scheme when against tlw EPA itself, for only 
the public -- certainly not the polluter -- has the 
incentive to COillplain if the EPA falls short in one or 
another respect; yet the lack of measurable interest 
on the part of any incli vidual member of the public, and 
the difficulties inherent in complex litigation policies 
of the EPA have been corrected, and others, upheld, have 
been removed from the arena of dispute. Presumptively 
the pubLic has benefitted ... Under the circumstances 
it seems fair and sensible that the EPA should be 
taxed for petitioners' reasonable costs and attorneys' 
fees. Ibid. at 1982. 
It goes without saying that the policies and goals of NEPJ\J as previously recog-
nized by this Court, are equally as compelling ancl important as those recognized in 
the Clean Air Act. It lil,ewi~;e goes without saying that public interest-oriented 
li tj g<mts; of the type bringing this suit, have a crucial role to play in ensunng 
agency compliance with the manchtes o£ NEPA through the vehicle of public .interest 
litigation. R~J~Ort of the_ Lcg~ll Advism~~--C:on~ni~tce of the Cotmcil on Envi Tonment:.:.l 
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Qu"J 1. t'' to tl'"' Prnc::-i ,-1 "'~.,. )inc lq71 a·t 527 
•,.J.. -·- ) 1'-...-·~--'--···--~...:.--~--=-) -''--' •' - J C ... I • 
The couTt below, in denying appellants' motion for reasonable attorneys' fees, 
did not articulate t],c reasons therefor:;, and it could be al'b,.rtJcJ that the denial 
\vas a sisr1ple exercise of the court's discretion. Under onl:inaly circl.mlStances, the 
allocation of costs and attorneys fees is properly left to the trial judge, with 
appellate review left to findings of ;:-busc of discretion. Appellants submit, hmv-
ever, that the court's action below vms based on a misapprehension of substantive 
law, this being a new and growing area of the law, rather tha.'l on a simple ahuse 
of discretion. As such, the denial ls clearly subject to reversal. Ne1vton v. 
Consolidated Gas CompanY, 265 U.S. 78 (1924). 
'fhe attorneys' fees problem in public interest litigation calls for more thmi an 
exercise of a trial court's discretion, it calls for a substantive consideration of 
the purposes behind applicable statutes put in issue. Federal appellate courts have 
freque:1tly reversed loHer court rulings d(:mying costs and fees in public interest 
litigation where the lower court failed to appreciate the need for an award of costs 
and fees under the applicable statut011 scheme. E.g., Lee v. Southen1 Home Sites 
CorD., 444 F. 2d 143 (5th Cir., 1971), supra. 
In Mil1s v. Electric Auto Life, 396 U.S. 375 (1970), plaintiffs brought a private: 
action under Sec. 14a of the Securities Act of 1934. After plaintiffs prevailed on 
the sole issue of liability, defendants filed an interlocutory appeal on the issue 
of liability with the Court of Appeals~ 1·1hich reversed. The Supreme Court reversed 
once more, reinstating the district court 1 s decision, and in doing so ordel'ed the 
defencb..nts to pay reasonable atton1ey fees dcspi te the fact that d::unages had not been 
set, nor hacl a final judgment been entered. In the opiJlion of the Court, the right 
to <:m award of atton1cys fees is an integral part of 11 ••• what constitutes a cause 
of action unc1er Sec 14a . . " 1bid. at 390. 1lJus, as viewed by the Court, tJ1e cp.1e.s · 
tion was one of dctcrminin~:; 1tory purpose, not of a trial court's discTcticm 
as such, the Supreme Court l: LJpel1;:Jtc jurisdiction to answer an esscntit=1lly "lc~~'tJ" 
question. 
-:-:-:-:-:-:-::::::::._---- ----------------_-_.._ --------:-:---:->:-:-: -:<-:-:-:-:-:-: ------------- t=:=-:-:-:-:-:-:-: -_---
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Appellees cc:m be cxpcc t:cd to contend th:J.t clcspi tc the clear applicability of t:. 
decisions Mel doctrines heretofore dj_scusscd to the present cause, that they otheTI·, i.'<? 
are imrm.n1c from the levying of attorneys fees w1der 28 LT.S.C. Sec. 2412, ~Aihich l)TO-
vides in pertinent part: 
Except as othenvise specific-1J.ly provided by sto_tute, 
a judgment for costs . . . but not including the fees 
and expenses of attorneys rrny be awarded to tLe pre-
vailing paTty in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency ... of the United States 
l\~1ile Sec. 2412 is a relinquishment of the sovereign's irm11W1i ty protection as 
to costs, which protection existed under Sec. 2412 prior to its amendment in 1966, 
the new Sec. 2412 retains vestiges of imrrn.mi ty for the pa;irnent of attorneys fees. 
Thus, the central jurisdictional question posed by the appellants' requcst for attor-
· neys 1 fees is 1vhethcr appellee Tennessee Valley Authority (1VA) is an "agency . . . of 
the United States" for the purposes of Sec. 2412. Allpel1fmts submit that it i::; not, 
and that 'IYA has aone of the p1·otections . of sovereign immtmi ty save when it acts ln 
the name of. thc sovereii:,'Tl in condemnation actions, and that, therefore, there is no 
"jurisdictional barrier that exists to the av:arding of attorneys fees against TVA. 
TVA is but one of many corporate entities created by the Congress to perform 
governmental ftmct.ions. It is settled that the Congressional creation of a corpoTa-
tion does not confer on the entity any protections of the sovereig11 and that im:r1lmity 
protection must by statute be specifically and unequivocally grm1tcd. For instm1Ce, 
in Keifer and Keifer v. ReconstilJction Fin:mce Corp. , supTa, 306 U.S. 381 (1938), the 
Supreme Court addressed itsclf to a Federal corporation's protect:~on from litigation 
under soverei.cn innmmi ty principles where the oTganic legislation contained no lan;ua~~e 
reJ.at.i vc to the corpoTation 1 s power and susceptibility to ''sue or be sued". The Court 
held: 
Therefore, the govccrnmcnt does not becomc the conduit of its immmity in suits against j ts <1gents or instnm1ent:::ditics 
merely becanse they cln its \\'ork ... For more than o_ hunJrcd years corpor:t Lions h:n c been u~~ccl as .::tgcnc:ies for cloj ng \\"or}~ 
of the go\'Clll.IJ~cnt. Congress may create tl1cm as appropd:Jtc 
means of executing the pm-;l'rs of governments . . . nut this 
woulcl not confer on such corpor:ltions lq;al immunity even if 
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the conventional to-suc·-and-be sued clause were o;nittcd ... 
Congress m:Jy, of: course, endow a gm.·crnmcntal CCilT>OrCl t ion 
with tbc ·'~ovcn1mc.:nt's jJmm1nity. l3ut always the <J,Ilcstion js: 
h<lS it done so? Ibid. at 388, 389. (Citations omitted). 
Under Keifer, supra, then, the test is not whcthe.,.. Congn;ss has pcrmi ttccl a 
corporation to sue or be sued 1 but whet.t1cr Congress conferred an imrmmi ty not othsl~.:i '':: 
available. -
Menjhan Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1940), where the Court dealt with the more germane questic:J. 
of Federal corporate jJTDTiunity from taxation of statutory costs under the then existing 
Rule 54 (d) standards \1'hich prohibited the t; xli1g of costs against "the United States. . 
and agencies . . . only to the extent permitted by law''. Noting that "ii'nmuni ty is not 
to be pres~ned;'thc Court held: 
And: 
Congress has expressly provided that the Reconstruction 
Finance Cor11ora tion shall have power 'to sue a:n.d be sued, 
to complain and defend, in any court of competent juris-
diction State or Federal'. There is nothing in the sta-
tutes governing its tr:msactlons ~~::jCJ1Suc~2"sts arn- inten-
tion of ConPress thJ.t -in suing .:n;d -l)e:J:n;;-.succ~-:u;ec:~-01-i_,oi:;-a­
tion should,,not be sub i cct to~the ordin~rv iD~ident of L:J!-
successful liti·:::~-ttion ln be-ing J~1ilb1e for th.:=:.t \vhich might 
properlv be a\•.'ard-::;d ~hJainsta }2/iv<:~te-oo-;:~t~i a s1mrral---
cas'-_· Ibid. at 83. (Emphasis supplied). 
The payrnent of costs by the lmsuccessful litigant, award2d by 
the c( urt Dl the proper exercise of the authority it possesses, is manifestly such an incident (to the witholding of immmity). ll1e addj tiona1 aJ lc·~·:ancc made by courts of couitv in accord-
ance '\'.'itl1 sound C:C't~:!Tt~ilct~cc' is likewise' suc}1 M inciden!_. (Citing _01rc1_2.~!e \;. L~coni~_:\a~~~ B:.:l!lk,_ 307 U.S. lo1 (19~~9), 
which dealt 'Jith a court's equitable pov;r;;r to award attorneys' fees). Ibii_. at 85. (Emph<1sis supplied). 
As the court pointed out u1 Keif~I:_, Congress has the power to grant immmi ty to 
Federal coTporations, and if it does so, Federal courts \•Jill respect that gT<mt of 
immunity. Congress hos granted limited i1nnrurd ty, for instm1ce, to the Federal Savin:::;s 
and Loan Insura.:nco Corporation (FSLIC) y where it ho.s provided in its organic legis1a L:io:: 
that ". . . (FSLIC) sbCJ.ll be deemed to be 2111 agency of the United States wi tld_n the 
meaning of section 1151 of Tit1c 28 11 ,.12 U.S.C. Section 1'72>0(1z) (l) (A). Title 28 U.S.C. 
Section 4 51 contains dcLi.nition:1l criteria foT all of Title 28, includj; ·ction 2-H?. 
1::·:::::::::-:-:-:,:-:::::::·:_._:_·.·-=:-.-.. ·. ·.·.·.·.·.· ::,:-":-::-:-:-:-:-·-·.·.· -:-.:--::= -----------:-:: 
In Cas:~ata_ v. l<Ji. f C_, 44S F. 2d 122 (7th Cir. 1971), the Court recognized the i;;:p01 -
tance of the language in the FSLIC' s organic longc..tage and tl1ercfore concluded that the_, 
agency Has and is not wnerw.blc to an award of atton1eys' fees W1dcr the Hell·-est0bli.s 
principles of Keifer and ncconstructi~n Finance CorE_., both supra. 
Conp_'ess has gnmted no such inm1Lmity to TVA, as can be seen from ;a_ reading of 16 
U.S.C. Sec. 831, unless TVA is procec-Jinz in condcrnno.tion actions in tbc name of the 
United States as required by 16 U.S.C. Sec. 833. ·n1is Court recog11ized as much in U.S. 
ex rel TVA v. Pressnel, 328 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1964), where the conderrmee unsuccessfull,-----
' 
sought costs from TV/L This decision was after the passage of 28 U.S.C. Section 451 bu-:= 
before the liberalization of Section 2412. Thus, the question posed was whether TVA, as 
a corporation created by Congress, is an agency of the United States within the me.:mir'g 
of Section 2412. TI1is Court held that it \vas and is, but only in condemnation action:= .. 
Had TVA been the real party in interest, -this Court pointed out, costs would ha.ve been 
allowable notlvithstanding the then existing Section 2412 prohi1 ition under Keifer and 
Reconstruction Financr=- C01poration, sunra. ~--
Other courts have held that TVA is not to be treated as a Federal agency Hi thin tl:·..:-
meaning of other provisions of Title 28. In Natural Resourc;s Defense Cmmcil v. TE-n-
nessee Valley Authority, 459 F. 2d 255, 3 ERC 1976 (2d Cir., 1972), the Court held that 
TVA is not a Federal agency within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Section 1391, relating to 
venue. TI1e Court reasoned that TVA, unlike other Federal agencies, " ... operates in 
much of the same \·.;ay as an o1·dinary business corporation, under the control of its 
directors in Tennessee, and not under that of a cabli1et officer or independent agency 
headquartered in Washington . . " Ibid. at 257. 
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing authorities, the district court errc3 
in failing to awo.rd reason:1ble attorneys' fees and all costs to appellants. 
COI'\CLUSI00/ 
TI1e judgment of the district court should be reversed o.nd further construction of 
the Tellico Project enjoined until such time, if ever, 8S TVA complies with ec,ch of the-
statutes 1·elicd upon in th.is Brief. 
Respectfully submi ttc(1, 
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